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AUCTION THEORY AND STANDSTILLS:  
DEALING WITH FRIENDS AND FOES IN A SALE 
OF CORPORATE CONTROL 
CHRISTINA M. SAUTTER∗ 
Abstract  
 A fundamental issue in Delaware mergers & acquisi-
tions (M&A) law is the extent to which a target company’s 
board of directors may restrict a sales process to extract 
value from bidders and grant a “winning bidder” certain 
deal protections to protect a transaction from being over-
bid.  Standstill agreements are one such form of deal pro-
tection.  Standstills prevent bidders from making or an-
nouncing a bid for the target without the target’s consent 
both during the sales process and for a period after the 
sales process is completed and the target has executed an 
agreement with a “winning bidder.”  Recent 2011 and 
2012 Delaware Court of Chancery rulings have placed a 
new spotlight on the use of standstill agreements in M&A 
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deals and specifically in change of control transactions.  
In particular, these cases highlight the restrictiveness of 
some standstills and open up discussion as to how restric-
tive a standstill may be without violating a target compa-
ny board of directors’ duty to maximize stockholder value.   
 This Article makes a unique contribution because it is 
the first paper to apply auction theory in critiquing and 
evaluating the need for standstills in M&A transactions.  
Auction theory utilizes economics to design optimal bid-
ding procedures and revenue-enhancing auctions.  The 
application of auction theory to standstills is particularly 
well suited as the execution of a standstill is often cited as 
resulting in increased value during the sales process.  Us-
ing auction theory and recent Delaware case law as a 
foundation, this Article provides a new framework for the 
use of standstills. It argues that to the extent standstills 
provide an entry into the due diligence and general sales 
processes, standstills may help to enhance value.  Moreo-
ver, the promise of standstill restrictions continuing post-
signing may aid in incentivizing bidders to submit their 
highest offers during the pre-signing sale process.  But 
the use of more restrictive standstills like those in which 
a bidder agrees not to request a waiver and a target 
agrees in advance not to waive a standstill (or Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Waive (DADW) standstills) should turn on whether 
strategic or financial bidders are involved in the process 
as well as the amount of pre-signing shopping of the tar-
get engaged in by the board.  This Article provides a new 
framework for dealmakers and for courts taking into con-
sideration those factors.  Among other things, this frame-
work suggests that if dealmakers are to continue their use 
of DADW standstills, that they be paired with a minimal 
fiduciary out and with a staggered termination fee.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 A fundamental tension in mergers and acquisitions law 
exists between a selling company’s board of directors’ duty 
to maximize stockholder value in a sale of control and the 
board’s ability to restrict the sales process and grant a 
“winning bidder” certain covenants to protect the transac-
tion from being overbid.1  Standstill agreements are one 
such way the board of a selling company, the target, re-
stricts the sales process and discourages overbids.2  In 
particular, standstills prevent bidders who are participat-
ing in the sales process from making or announcing a bid 
for the target without the target’s consent both during the 
sales process and for a period after the process is complet-
                                                   
1  See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (describing a board of 
directors as "auctioneers charged with getting the best 
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company"); Om-
nicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 
(Del. 2003) (describing board of directors’ authority to 
grant deal protection to a “winning bidder”). 
2   The target and its financial advisor generally require 
auction participants execute a confidentiality agreement 
before gaining access to the target’s nonpublic infor-
mation.  Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, Stra-
tegic & Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions (2010) 
(manuscript at 7), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15594
81.  The standstill can be a separate standalone document 
or, more typically, appears as a provision in the confiden-
tiality agreement.  Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. 
Vulcan Materials Co., 2012 WL 2783101, at *8 n.43 (Del. 
July 10, 2012).   The terms standstill, standstill agree-
ment, and standstill provision will be used interchangea-
bly in this Article. 
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ed and the target has executed an agreement with a 
“winning” bidder.3   
 Standstills help the target to control the sales process 
and ensure bidders do not preempt the process by making 
offers directly to the target’s stockholders or by otherwise 
bidding before the target is ready to receive offers.4  
Moreover, pre-signing, standstills may help a board to 
satisfy its duty to maximize stockholder value, or its 
Revlon duties, as standstills may “provide the [target 
board] leverage to extract concessions from the parties 
who seek to make a bid.”5  Because most standstills do not 
expire upon the target’s execution of a definitive agree-
ment with a “winning” bidder, most standstills are in-
tended to prevent later overbidding between the signing 
and closing of the contemplated transaction (the pre-
                                                   
3  Martin Marietta, 2012 WL 2783101, at *8.    
4  William G. Lawlor, Taming the Tiger: Difficult Stand-
still Agreement Issues for Targets, 7, 7 (July-Aug. 2007), 
published in Deal Lawyers, available at 
http://www.dechert.com/library/C&SLawlor-
TamingtheTiger.pdf. (providing standstills “provide[] a 
stable environment in which the sale process can be man-
aged and controlled by the target.”). 
5  In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. 
Ch. 2007)..  In a 2011 case dealing with a standstill waiv-
er, Chancellor Strine reiterated this view saying,  
I mean, it is pretty well understood that part 
of what you can do as a first-in bidder who is 
actually binding yourself to buy a company is 
get some deal protections that insure that, 
you know, you won’t be topped lightly; that 
there aren’t free riders; and then make the 
target board make certain determinations 
before they get out of a merger agreement. 
In re Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. 
Action Nos. 6574-CS & 6776-CS, 22 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 
2011).  
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closing period).6  In this way, targets and winning bidders 
use standstills as a form of deal protection device pre-
closing.  For these reasons, standstills have been called 
“the [mergers and acquisitions] equivalent of a schoolyard 
‘time-out.’”7  In other words, standstills keep friendly bid-
ders friendly and prevent those bidders from becoming 
foes either to the target or to the winning bidder.  Despite 
the intended benefits of standstills, like any deal protec-
tion device, standstills are not without drawbacks.  Be-
cause a target board’s Revlon duties do not end at the ex-
ecution of a definitive agreement but instead continue un-
til the stockholders vote on the proposed transaction, 
standstills potentially hinder the board from complying 
                                                   
6  Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made to be Broken?  
Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, 
37 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 
982), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=20208
28 (describing the conflict that exists between a board’s 
duty to maximize stockholder value and its ability to 
grant deal protection provisions); Robert E. Spatt, The 
Four Ring Circus-Round Sixteen; A Further Updated 
View of the Mating Dance Among Announced Merger 
Partners and an Unsolicited Second or Third Bidder, 40 
(Feb. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.stblaw.com/google_file.cfm?TrackedFile=4B46
116604D6E9D896B179&TrackedFolder=585C1D235281A
ED996A07D5F9F9478AB5A90188899 (discussing intend-
ed goal of standstills is to prevent deal jumping).    
7 Proxy Battle Time-Out:  Standstills Give Boards a 
Breather, 
http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/2009/07/200
90731_0005.aspx?cid=&src= (April 9, 2009); Lawlor, su-
pra note 4, at 7. 
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with its Revlon duties.8  More specifically, standstills pre-
vent bidders from making overbids and may prevent 
boards from considering overbids even if the overbid pro-
vides more value than the deal with the “winning bid-
der.”9  Moreover, there is always a risk a target board 
may use a standstill to improperly favor one bidder over 
another or to otherwise entrench itself in office.10   
 Recently, the Delaware courts have issued several de-
cisions commenting on the restrictiveness of some stand-
stills and their potential interference in the satisfaction of 
a board’s Revlon duties.11  As a result, there has been a 
                                                   
8  STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR:  SHOTGUN TAKEO-
VERS, GOVERNMENT BY DEAL, AND THE PRIVATE EQUITY IM-
PLOSION 236 (2009) (explaining that under Revlon a target 
“must keep itself up for sale . . . up to the shareholder vote 
on the transaction”); Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938 (“The di-
rectors of a Delaware corporation have a continuing obli-
gation to discharge their fiduciary responsibilities, as fu-
ture circumstances develop, after a merger agreement is 
announced.”).     
9  In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., Civ. Action No. 6304-
VCP, 54 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (describing board’s ina-
bility to consider higher offers made by bidder who is sub-
ject to a standstill); see also Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, 
Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders, 19 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1399, 1402 (2006) (“[Deal protection] devices make 
the target less attractive to rejected bidders, thereby re-
ducing their incentive to top up the winning bid.”).   
10  Topps, 926 A.2d at 91. 
11  See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan 
Materials Co., 2012 WL 2783101 (Del. July 10, 2012); In 
re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012); In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., 
Civ. Action No. 6304-VCP (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012); In re 
Rehabcare Group, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-
VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011); In re Topps Co. S’holders 
Litig., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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surge in the attention being paid to standstills by practi-
tioners.12  But, to date, scholars have yet to address the 
dichotomy standstills raise between aiding and hindering 
value maximization.  I have previously touched upon this 
dichotomy by using past Delaware case law to analyze 
how the Delaware courts are likely to address particularly 
                                                   
12  See, e.g., Steven M. Haas, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” 
Standstill Agreements under Attack, 26 INSIGHTS 29 
(Dec. 2012); Sarkis Jebejian & Daniel E. Wolf, An Ounce 
of Prevention – Some Guidance for Target Boards, Kirk-
land M&A Update, 2 (Jan. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpda
te_011413.pdf; Trevor S. Norwitz, Igor Kirman, & Wil-
liam Savitt, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills” Revisit-
ed (Rapidly), CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 9, 2013), availa-
ble at 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/09/dont-ask-
dont-waive-standstills-revisited-rapidly/; William Savitt, 
Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills, THE HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINAN-
CIAL REGULATION (Dec. 18, 2012, 8:51 a.m.), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/18/dont-
ask-dont-waive-standstills/; Gary E. Thompson & Steven 
M. Haas, The State of M&A Standstills In Delaware, 
Hunton & Williams Client Alert (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.hunton.com/files/News/b91c8716-e69d-4ef1-
b510-
c3810f99af9d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/ee1368da-
fab8-489e-9652-
c3a423539c68/DE_MA_Standstill_Agreements.pdf; Peter 
J. Walsh, Jr., Janine M. Salomone, & David B. DiDonato, 
Delaware Insider: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” Standstill 
Provisions: Impermissible Limitation on Director Fiduci-
ary Obligations or Legitimate, Value-Maximizing Tool?, 
2013 Jan. Bus. L. Today 1.    
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restrictive standstills.13  My analysis assumed, however, 
the continued existence of standstills as they are current-
ly being utilized in most mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
transactions and did not address the fundamental issues 
of the extent to which boards may use standstills to re-
strict the sales process or protect an executed deal.14  This 
Article addresses these fundamental issues by applying 
auction theory to critique and evaluate the role of stand-
stills in M&A transactions.  Auction theory utilizes eco-
nomics to design optimal bidding procedures and revenue-
enhancing sales processes.  The application of auction 
theory to standstills is particularly well suited as targets 
require the execution of standstills based on the theory 
that standstills help to increase value during the sales 
process.  Despite dealmaker’ assumption that standstills 
are revenue enhancing scholars have not used auction 
theory to examine standstills and test this assumption 
until now.          
 In applying auction theory to standstills, this Article 
makes a unique contribution to M&A legal scholarship by 
providing answers to some fundamental questions pre-
sented by every sale of corporate control.  Part I of this 
Article describes auction theory as it relates to the M&A 
sales process.  Part II details a target board’s fiduciary 
duties in the context of a sale of corporate control and ex-
plores the typical sales processes used by public compa-
nies.  Part III details Delaware cases addressing the need 
for and possible enforcement of various standstills.  Part 
                                                   
13  See generally Sautter, supra note 6.  In Promises Made 
to be Broken?  Standstill Agreements in Change of Con-
trol Transactions, I specifically address a target board’s 
ability to consider a third party superior offer made in 
contravention of a standstill; a board’s promise not to 
waive a standstill; and a board’s ability to grant a “win-
ning” bidder the right to enforce a previously executed 
standstill against a “losing” bidder.  See id.  
14  Id. at manuscript at 60.  
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IV uses auction theory and recent Delaware cases to de-
velop a new framework for dealmakers and courts, taking 
into consideration whether strategic or financial bidders 
are involved in the sales process as well as the amount of 
pre-signing shopping done by the target board.  Among 
other things, this new framework suggests that if 
dealmakers are to continue using certain more restrictive 
standstills, that they pair them with a minimal fiduciary 
out and staggered termination fee. 
I.  AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS     
  There is a substantial body of literature on auction 
theory generally and an increasing amount of literature 
on auction theory in the M&A context.  Little of this liter-
ature specifically focuses on deal protection devices and 
none of it specifically addresses the use of standstills in 
the auction process.  This Article addresses this gap and 
uses auction theory to propose a new framework for the 
use of standstills in change of control transactions.   
  Academics have used auction theory to attempt to de-
sign sales processes that produce optimal revenue maxim-
izing auctions.15  Auction theory is developing rapidly and 
is increasingly being looked to for assistance in practical 
applications, but current auction theory is by no means 
complete.16  One practical application that may have the 
greatest impact is in the M&A field, which undoubtedly 
contains one of the largest markets for auctions.  Given 
the size of any typical M&A transaction and corporate fi-
duciary duties, there are few areas that could benefit 
more from an optimal sales process.  If auction theory 
could be used to design optimal auctions in M&A transac-
tions, then the outcome of the auction should be able to be 
                                                   
15 See generally Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide 
to the Literature, 13 J. ECON. SURVEY 227 (1999) (discuss-
ing optimal auction design). 
16  Id. at 248. 
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controlled largely through the structure of the sales pro-
cess. If designing an optimal sales process for any given 
intricate M&A transaction seems too good to be true at 
this point, it is because many factors can impact the re-
sults of any given auction.17  
 
A. Common Value versus Private Value Sales Process-
es 
 
  One of the many factors impacting the ultimate results 
of a sales process is the type of bidders involved.18  When 
financial buyers are the bidders in an auction, academics 
tend to define those auctions as common value auctions.19  
A common value auction is an auction in which all of the 
participants have the same or very similar value for the 
target.20  This is the case with financial buyers because 
they “can exploit the same sources of gains (e.g., cost cut-
ting, financial restructuring).”21  Conversely, a private 
value auction is one in which each bidder has a certain 
value it is willing to pay but is not aware of the value oth-
er bidders are willing to pay.22  Strategic, or trade, buyers 
are often interested in acquiring a target company to op-
timize possible unique synergies between the buyer and 
the target.23  Thus, strategic buyers tend to have differing 
                                                   
17 See id. at 234-47 (discussing many factors that impact 
auctions). 
18  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1399.  
19  Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang, & Paul Klemperer, Toe-
holds and Takeovers, 107 J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 427, 427 
(1999).  
20  J. Russel Denton, Note, Stacked Deck: Go-Shops and 
Auction Theory, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1535 (2008). 
21  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400.   
22  Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auc-
tions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICS 1089, 
1090 (1982). 
23  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400. 
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values for a target based on the value each individual 
strategic buyer places on those particular synergies.24  
Therefore, auction processes involving strategic bidders 
tend to be private value auctions.25  In addition, if the 
target’s management has teamed up with a financial buy-
er to engage in a management-led buyout (“MBO”) then 
the MBO team likely has better information regarding the 
target’s value than the typical financial buyer.26  In such 
case, the bidding process would be more similar to the 
private value auction.   
 The types of bidders involved in an auction impacts the 
auction results because strategic and financial bidders 
tend to value targets “in systematically different ways.”27  
Generally, strategic bidders are more likely to pay more 
“for smaller targets that have substantial internal cash 
reserves and that undertake significant research and de-
velopment activities.”28  Conversely, financial bidders are 
more likely to pay more relative to market value for un-
derperforming companies and “are insensitive” to other 
factors like the target’s size.29 
  The differing valuations between strategic and finan-
cial bidders arise from the differences in information 
within and between these general types of bidders who 
“are not always equally well informed” as well as from the 
type of information upon which each group tends to rely.30  
In fact, “a key feature of auctions is the presence of 
asymmetric information. (With perfect information most 
                                                   
24  Denton, supra note 20, at 1535.   
25  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400.  
26  Id. at 1399.  
27  Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.  
28  Id.   
29  Id.  
30  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400; Gorbenko & 
Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.  
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auction models are relatively easy to solve).”31 Of course, 
strategic bidders and buyers engaged in an MBO have 
asymmetric information because each bidder uses their 
own private information to value the object of the auc-
tion.32  That is, these types of bidders have superior in-
formation on the target either due to their status as in-
siders or due to how they value the company based on 
particular synergies.  In fact, strategic bidders “are less 
tied to publicly observable characteristics” like financial 
statements or market indicators so that the end result is 
that each strategic bidder’s valuation of the target is 
“unique.”33 
 Financial bidders can also have asymmetric infor-
mation.34  While their actual value of the object is the 
same, at least theoretically after the fact, each bidder has 
different private information about what the value actual-
ly is.35  For example, in the case of a corporation, while 
the value of the underlying assets should produce the 
same returns for any financial buyer in the long run, the 
bidder’s valuation estimates of those future returns may 
differ.  But, as Professors Alexander Gorbenko and 
Andrey Malenko explain in their manuscript, Strategic 
and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions, financial 
bidders’ valuations tend to be based “on observable fac-
tors, captured by the information about the targets avail-
able from the market and financial statements.”36  Thus, 
the end result is that, unlike strategic bidders, financial 
                                                   
31  Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Liter-
ature, 13 J. ECON. SURVEY 227, 248, 229 (1999). 
32  Denton, supra note 237, at 1535. 
33  Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.   
34 See Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1405 (stating that 
financial bidders may nevertheless have superior infor-
mation). 
35  Klemperer, supra note 15, at 229-30. 
36  Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.  
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bidders’ valuations “tend to be similar to each other and 
rather exchangeable from a target’s point of view.”37 
  Even granting these distinctions in the real world of 
dealmaking, the classification of one type of auction as a 
pure common value one or a pure private value one is not 
necessarily accurate.  Actual bidders rarely have identical 
valuations for an auctioned object nor are their valuations 
completely uncorrelated.38  As Professor Subramanian 
recognized in his book, Negotiauctions, “[e]ven with a 
seemingly pure private-value asset, there is a significant 
common-value element.”39 Thus, information will not be 
perfectly symmetric between all buyers because, even if 
they are all using the same information about the target 
company, each bidder evaluates that information differ-
ently.  In these situations involving asymmetric bidders, 
Professors Povel and Singh argue that “more biased pro-
cedures” should be used in the sale process, including deal 
protection devices.40 
 
B. Information in the Sales Process 
 
  The unique interpretation of information each bidder 
brings to the sales table impacts the question of whether 
standstills enhance the bidding process.  This uniqueness 
is especially relevant because, as discussed above, stand-
stills are inextricably tied to the provision of information.  
Numerous auction theorists have explored the role of in-
formation in the sales process.  Professors Bulow and 
Klemperer have found that “contrary to our usual instinct 
that auctions are profitable because they are efficient, it is 
                                                   
37  Id.   
38  Peter Crampton & Allen Schwartz, Using Auction The-
ory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 
27, 29 (1991). 
39  GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, NEGOTIAUCTIONS 93 (2010).   
40  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1417. 
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precisely the inefficiency of the auction – that entry into it 
is relatively ill-informed and therefore leads to a more 
random outcome – that makes it more profitable for the 
seller.”41  Once bidders have entered the auction, Profes-
sors Boone and Mulherin have found there is a fine line 
targets must walk in revealing proprietary information to 
bidders.  In particular, receiving proprietary information 
causes bidders to be more certain about their valuation of 
the company and in turn causes bidders to bid more.42  At 
the same time, however, a target’s provision of confiden-
tial information can “reduce the inherent value of the sell-
ing firm” because losing bidders can “gain competitive ad-
vantages.”43  As a result, a seller’s management of the 
sales process to limit the number and kind of bidders and 
otherwise manage the process to reduce information costs 
can “actually create value.”44 
Some have argued, based on the Revenue Equivalence 
Theorem or the logic of marginal revenue versus marginal 
cost, that even by taking into account asymmetric infor-
mation an optimal auction, in theory, can be created.45  
This particular theorem states that the auction type does 
not influence the revenue produced by an auction regard-
less of the information each bidder has.46  Under the theo-
rem, “all the ‘standard’ auctions . . . yield the same ex-
                                                   
41  Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1546. 
42  Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Is There One 
Best Way to Sell a Company?  Auctions Versus Negotia-
tions and Controlled Sales, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28, 
33 (2009).   
43  Id.; see also Auctions in the M&A Process, FINANCIER 
WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2007); available at 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%
26A_Process.pdf. (“The seller in an auction risks opening 
itself up to tactical investigation by competitors.”). 
44  Id. at 28. 
45  Klemperer, supra note 15, at 232-33. 
46  Id. at 232. 
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pected revenue under the stated conditions, as do many 
non-standard auctions.”47  However, this theory “applies 
very generally,” and rests on a number of assumptions, 
including that bidders are risk neutral; that bidders’ pri-
vate information is independent of competitors’ private 
information; and that bidders’ private values are drawn 
from a common distribution.48  But, more recent develop-
ments have suggested that standard auctions cannot be 
optimal in the presence of bidder asymmetry, and an in-
crease in bidder asymmetry can hurt the seller if it uses a 
standard auction.49 
 Even if optimal auctions could be created by varying 
these assumptions50, many other factors can influence the 
outcome of an auction that most models have not been ex-
tended to completely account for.51  These factors include 
the entry costs and number of bidders; ability of bidders 
to collude; and the divisibility of the unit for sale in the 
auction (or multi-unit auctions).52  The idea of a multi-
unit auction or the divisibility of a business into separate 
units is generally not examined in auction theory litera-
ture. 53  However, this singular focus may be misplaced 
when using auction literature to interpret M&A transac-
tions because of the large indivisible number of assets 
comprising a business.  Of the literature that does focus 
                                                   
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1403. 
50  See Klemperer, supra note 15, at 234-36 (finding gen-
erally that optimal auction can be created in some cases 
regardless of assumptions). 
51  See id. at 238-47 (discussing implications of various 
factors on results of Revenue Equivalence Theorem mak-
ing creation of efficient optimal auctions difficult). 
52  Id. at 238-47. 
53  Id. at 240 (“Most auction theory . . . restricts attention 
to the sale of a single indivisible unit.”). 
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on multi-unit auctions, the “main message . . . is that it is 
very hard to achieve efficient outcomes.”54  Furthermore, 
most existing auction literature only allows for the case of 
either private value or common value bidding environ-
ments, that is, an auction that only contains either finan-
cial or strategic buyers, but not both.55  But the likelihood 
of the presence of such distinct classifications is not real-
istic.  
 Nonetheless, at least one proposal has been made by 
Professors Povel and Singh setting forth a “simple and re-
alistic” optimal selling procedure to incorporate these 
asymmetries that could be particularly applicable to M&A 
transactions.56  This sequential selling procedure model 
“requires commitment to its rules, and deal protection de-
vices [to] help the target cement this commitment.”57  At 
the same time commitment to the rules in a M&A sales 
process may be too much to hope for.  As Professor 
Subramanian has pointed out,  
Auctions in the real world are messy.  The 
rules are unclear and constantly changing.  
Price is just one of the many terms to be de-
cided.  The seller is not a passive participant 
after establishing the rules of the game.  All 
of these real-world factors violate the fun-
damental assumptions on which much of 
auction theory is based.     
In the present state of auction theory, even if Professors 
Povel and Singh’s model allowed for an optimal selling 
procedure, it could not do so alone.  Some other structural 
protection device would be needed to ensure the best bid-
ding process. 
 
C. Standstills in the Sales Process 
                                                   
54  Id. at 243. 
55  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. at 1425. 
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One structural protection device used in the vast ma-
jority of sales is the standstill.  Standstills generally pre-
vent potential buyers from engaging in activity that may 
be considered hostile to the target.58  More specifically, “a 
standstill agreement will prohibit a hostile bid in any 
form, including a tender offer to acquire stock control of 
the other contracting party and/or a proxy contest to re-
place all or some of its directors.”59  Although standstills 
can be standalone agreements, most appear as a provision 
in a confidentiality agreement.  Despite the close affilia-
tion between standstill agreements and confidentiality 
agreements, the two agreements serve vitally different 
functions.60  More specifically, the confidentiality agree-
ment is intended to prevent the use or disclosure of non-
public information whereas the standstill is intended to 
regulate the manner in which a party may gain control 
over the target.61  Along these lines, “[s]tandstill prohibi-
tions do not require, or in any way, depend upon, a con-
tracting party’s use or disclosure of the other party’s con-
fidential nonpublic information.”62  At the same time, the 
main purpose of including a standstill in a confidentiality 
agreement is to prevent “the buyer [from] hav[ing] an in-
formational advantage over other prospective bidders re-
sulting from its review of confidential information.”63  
Along these lines, standstills give “teeth” to confidentiali-
ty agreements which alone may not be enough to estab-
                                                   
58  Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials 
Co., 2012 WL 2783101, at *8 (Del. July 10, 2012).     
59  Id.  
60  Id.   
61  Id.  
62  Id.  
63 WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 157 (3d. 
2011).  
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lish insider trading liability under current federal securi-
ties laws.64   
Standstills have been described as the “cost of entry” 
into discussions with a target.65  In fact, some, if not most, 
targets will refuse to proceed with negotiations if the bid-
der refuses to execute the standstill.66  The standstill 
“serves as a kind of litmus test, an indication of a bidder’s 
true intentions.”67  A bidder can “try to modify the stand-
still as much as [it] can” but by executing the standstill 
                                                   
64  Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”: 
Rule 10b5-2(B)(1), Confidentiality Agreements, and the 
Proper Scope of Insider Trading Liability, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 1469, 1486 (2010) (“[This Note] finds that liability 
cannot be based on confidentiality agreements alone, for 
although the [United States] Supreme Court has been 
willing to stretch the duty requirement in the past, the 
Court has always required more than a duty to keep in-
formation in confidence.”).     
65  Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L. J. 621, 660 (2003).   
66  See Nicole E. Clark, Preliminary Agreements, in DOING 
DEALS 2009: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS & BOLTS OF 
TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE, at 80-81 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac-
tice Grp., Course Handbook Series No. 18777, 2009) (stat-
ing target generally asks bidder to execute standstill in 
exchange for confidential information); Meryl S. Rosen-
blatt, Letters of Intent and Exclusivity, Confidentiality 
and Standstill Agreements, in DRAFTING CORPORATE 
AGREEMENTS 2002-2003, at 237 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice 
Grp., Course Handbook Series No. B0-01K0, 2002-2003) 
(noting target may require standstill to ensure buyer re-
mains committed to transaction and to prevent buyer 
from pursuing hostile alternative). 
67  BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL:  MERGERS AND ACQUI-
SITIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 689 (2000). 
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the bidder is forsaking its “ability to launch an unsolicited 
offer.”68 
Because standstills work to restrict bidders, the length 
of these restrictions can become a significant issue during 
negotiations.  Typically, “auction-style standstill agree-
ments last only one or two years, on the basis that the 
confidential information to be provided to the bidders will 
have useful currency for only a relatively short time.”69  
Standstills can be longer than a year, even up to five 
years, but generally, standstills “with expirations between 
six months and one year are not uncommon; although, 
one year may be the norm.”70  For example, one commonly 
negotiated aspect of a standstill is whether the standstill 
will include a fall-away provision.  One practitioner de-
scribed a fall-away provision as an “escape hatch” for a 
buyer.71  A fall-away provision provides the standstill re-
strictions would no longer apply if another bidder not 
bound by a standstill makes an offer for the target or if 
the target executes a definitive acquisition agreement 
with another bidder.72  A target may resist this provision 
fearing it may prevent the bidder from submitting its best 
offer during the pre-signing sales process.73  But targets 
                                                   
68  Subramanian, supra note 70, at 662. 
69  Lawlor, supra note 4, at 11.  
70  Sautter, supra note 6, manuscript at 22-23. 
71 Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in Trans-
actions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 615, 636 (2012). 
72  Id.  
73  William Savitt, Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills, 
The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance 
and Financial Regulation (Dec. 18, 2012, 8:51 a.m.), 
available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/18/dont-ask-
dont-waive-standstills/ (“Sellers usually resist fall-aways 
both to prevent bidders from holding back and to induce 
22   AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS 
 
  
often end up agreeing to the fall-away as a way of moving 
along the sales process.74 Moreover, targets recognize the 
possibility may provide more value ultimately.75  Never-
theless, some practitioners argue that whether a target 
should agree to a fall-away standstill is context specific.76  
For example, if the target has decided that it is definitely 
for sale and “is going to run a process that’s definitely go-
ing to end in a sale” a target may be more willing to agree 
to a fall-away.77  As is evident from the foregoing, whether 
a standstill falls away is often a matter of some debate. 
Another matter of some debate among practitioners is 
the viability and enforceability of Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive 
(or “DADW”) standstills.  These standstills prevent a po-
tential bidder who had executed a standstill from request-
ing a waiver of the standstill           
II.   FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND M&A SALE PROCESSES  
 
 In analyzing standstills and their related sub provi-
sions, auction theory cannot be considered in a vacuum, 
as there are other significant considerations in the context 
of a sale of a publicly traded, Delaware corporation.  
Namely, a well-developed body of Delaware case law gov-
erning a target board’s fiduciary duties significantly in-
fluences such sales.  Moreover, there is the practical con-
sideration regarding the processes by which targets actu-
                                                                                                                  
them, by promising certainty, to put their best offer on 
the table.”).  
74  Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in 
Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116 
PENN ST. L. REV. 615, 636 (2012).  
75  Id.  (“At the end of the day, if you have what you think 
is the highest price in an auction, it’s not a bad thing that 
[the bidder] wants to come in and put more money on the 
table.”)              
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
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ally go about selling themselves.  This section first details 
the fiduciary duties applicable to a target board’s actions 
in a sale of corporate control.  Then the following sections 
describe the various sales methods upheld by Delaware 
courts and available to a target board.  The role of stand-
stills in each sale method is emphasized. 
 
A. Fiduciary Duties in a Sale of Corporate Control 
 
 The seminal Delaware Supreme Court case of Revlon v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. provides that once a 
sale of corporate control becomes inevitable, “a board’s 
primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible 
for selling the company to the highest bidder.”78  Since 
this holding the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized 
that “no single blueprint exists” for a board to satisfy its 
Revlon duties.79  The courts have acknowledged that not 
every sale requires a full-blown auction process but rather 
the board of directors of a selling corporation must meet 
“a reasonableness standard.”80  Moreover, in selecting an 
acquirer and in rejecting other offers, boards are not 
bound to make that decision solely based on the price be-
ing offered.  Instead, the target board may consider a va-
riety of factors, including the offer terms and feasibility, 
financing, the likelihood of consummation of the proposed 
transaction, and “the bidder's identity, prior background 
                                                   
78  Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).   
79  Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 
(Del. 1989).   
80  Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, C.A. No. 5878-VCL at 
6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011); see also Barkan, 567 A.2d at 
1286 (“Revlon does not demand that every change in the 
control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated 
bidding contest.”).   
24   AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS 
 
  
and other business venture experiences.”81  Just because a 
company is in Revlon-mode, does not prevent a target’s 
board “from offering bidders deal protections, so long as 
its decision to do so was reasonably directed to the objec-
tive of getting the highest price, and not” a self-dealing 
goal “to tilt the playing field towards a particular bidder 
for reasons unrelated to the stockholders' ability to get top 
dollar.”82   
    
B. M&A Sales Processes 
 
 The Delaware courts have upheld a variety of sale 
methods as meeting the reasonableness standard. This 
section explores the typical sales methods used in a sale of 
corporate control and upheld by the Delaware courts:  a 
classic public auction, pre-signing market canvass, nego-
tiated acquisition, and post-signing market checks.  Alt-
hough this Article addresses each of these sale methods 
on an individual basis, many targets may use a combina-
tion of two or more of these methods in any one transac-
tion. 
 
1. Classic Full-Blown Auction 
 
  The classic full-blown auction is generally thought to 
be the easiest way for a board to ensure satisfaction of its 
fiduciary duties pre-signing.83  Not only is a classic auc-
                                                   
81  Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 
1282 n.29 (Del. 1988).    
82  In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holders Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 
1000-01 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
83  See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 746 (“A wide-
ranging auction generally maximizes value, particularly 
since the ‘best buyer’ on paper is not always the party who 
eventually pays the highest price.”); Samuel C. Thomp-
son, § 5:5 The Delaware Law Governing Fiduciary Duties 
in M&A, in MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND TENDER OFFERS, 
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tion thought to be the easiest way to prove compliance 
with fiduciary duties but, as Professors Jeremy Bulow 
and Paul Klemperer found in a recent study, “the 
straightforward, level-playing-field competition that an 
auction creates is usually more profitable for a seller than 
a sequential process.”84  However, in another study of 400 
takeovers of U.S. corporations during the 1990s, Profes-
sors Audra Boone and Harold Mulherin found that there 
were not substantial differences between the wealth ef-
fects resulting from auctions versus those resulting from 
negotiations.85  Despite finding that auctions were not 
                                                                                                                  
5-201 (PLI April, 2012) (recognizing best way to sell pub-
licly held companies may be through “active and fair auc-
tion[s]” and stating “[a]ctual market testing through an 
auction may be more beneficial than relying solely on in-
vestment bankers to assess valuation”); Auctions in the 
M&A Process, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2007); avail-
able at 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%
26A_Process.pdf. (“The basics of what sellers are looking 
for in an auction remain the same:  maximum price, high 
certainty of completing the transaction and management’s 
preferred buyer.”).  See also Christina M. Sautter, Shop-
ping During Extended Store Hours:  From No Shops to 
Go-Shops – The Development, Effectiveness, and Implica-
tions of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transac-
tions, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 525 at 576 (2008) (hereinafter, 
“Go-Shops”) (noting Delaware courts consider public auc-
tions or pre-signing targeted market canvasses to be val-
ue maximization procedures).   
84  Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Why Do Sellers 
(Usually) Prefer Auctions?, 99 AMER. ECON. REV. 1544, 
1545 (2009). 
85  Audra L. Boone & Harold Mulherin, How are Firms 
Sold?, LXII J. OF FINAN. 847, 871 (2007) (hereinafter, How 
are Firms Sold?).   
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necessarily better at maximizing stockholder value as ne-
gotiations, Boone and Mulherin found that half of the 400 
takeovers studied result from an auction process.86  Thus, 
the auction process is certainly a popular form of sale 
even if business scholars debate whether it is more bene-
ficial to stockholders than negotiations.     
  Generally, the auction begins with the preparation of 
an offering memorandum describing in detail the target’s 
business.87  At the same time the offering memorandum is 
being prepared, the target’s financial advisor devises a 
list of potential purchasers.88  The financial advisor then 
contacts the potential purchasers and those potential 
buyers who express a potential interest in the target are 
required to execute a confidentiality agreement before be-
ing given the offering memorandum and, in some cases, 
other information.89  In most deals, the confidentiality 
agreement will contain a standstill.90  Thus, auction par-
ticipants enter the auction process without first determin-
ing the value of the company and without knowing what 
other bidders will bid.91  It is this lack of knowledge that 
                                                   
86  Id. at 869. 
87  WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 746.   
88  Id. at 746; see also Robert G. Hansen, Auctions of 
Companies, 39 ECON. INQUIRY 30, 30 (2001) (stating that 
potential bidder list likely includes “competitors, suppli-
ers, customers, and acquisition oriented conglomerates or 
leveraged buyout houses”).    
89  WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 746.   
90  Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in 
Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116 
PENN ST. L. REV. 615, 636 (2012) (stating confidentiality 
agreements typically contain standstill provisions).  
91  Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1545.  As prom-
inent investment banker, Bruce Wasserstein, explained, 
“[t]he auction format naturally creates tension-especially 
the blind auction in which bidders are not told how many 
other parties they are competing against. .  .  .  If the auc-
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Professors Bulow and Klemperer contend enhance value 
maximization in an auction.92   
  At a predetermined date pursuant to the target’s bid-
ding procedures, the interested bidders are required to 
submit a preliminary, nonbinding indication of interest.93  
These indications of interest “will either be a number or 
range of numbers that are supposed to represent bidders’ 
first approximations of their estimates of value of the tar-
get.’”94  The target and its financial advisor usually then 
narrow the field of bidders based on the prices contained 
in the indications of interests and other factors.95  At this 
point, the narrowed field of bidders is asked to participate 
                                                                                                                  
tioneer is able and the integrity of the process is main-
tained, even a single bidder can be induced to enter a ‘full’ 
bid.”  WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 748 (emphasis add-
ed).   
92  Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1546 
(“[C]ontrary to our usual instinct that auctions are profit-
able because they are efficient, it is precisely the ineffi-
ciency of the auction – that entry into it is relatively ill-
informed and therefore leads to a more random outcome – 
that makes it more profitable for the seller.”) (emphasis in 
original) ); see also Afra Afsharipour, A Shareholders' Put 
Option: Counteracting the Acquirer Overpayment Prob-
lem, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1018, 1041 (2012) (“First, since a 
target's real value is unknown at the time of the acquisi-
tion, ‘habitually optimistic therefore likely to overestimate 
a target's value.’ Second, managers may overpay because 
they are ignorant of bidding theory and are vulnerable to 
the ‘winner's curse.’ Thus, on average, for an asset whose 
value is unknown, the winning bid is the one that overes-
timates the value of the asset.”). 
93  WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 746. 
94  Hansen, supra note 20, at 31. 
95  WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 747. 
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in a second round of bidding.96  This is usually the point 
at which the target’s management will hold presentations 
for the bidders, the bidders will receive access to either an 
online or physical data room to perform due diligence, and 
plant or site visits will occur.97  In some cases, bidders 
will be expected to complete due diligence review before 
final bids are submitted.98  Thus, the final bids will not be 
subject to satisfactory completion of due diligence.99  In 
addition, the target will send the final bidders a sample 
purchase agreement that the final bidders will mark-up 
and return with their offers on the final bid date.100   
  The auction winner is chosen based in large part on 
the offer price but other factors, including the purchase 
agreement mark-up, can play a significant role.101  For 
example, financing, antitrust issues, closing certainty, 
and reverse termination fees are just some of the factors 
that targets may consider in choosing an auction win-
                                                   
96  Id. 
97  Id.; Hansen, supra note 20, at 31. 
98  WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 747. 
99  See id. (noting that in certain instances bid winner is 
announced on final bid date). 
100  Id.   
101  See id. (stating “[p]rice often is the determining factor 
in an auction” and differentiating between bidders who 
have submitted “unfavorable contract” versus bidders who 
have submitted “’clean’” contract).  But see Jack & Suzy 
Welch, Why Joe Biden is Wrong About Private Equity Ex-
ecs, FORTUNE, JULY 2, 2012, at 42 (“Usually several firms 
are vying for the business, but it’s not accurate to assume 
that price is the sole determinant of who wins.  Just as 
critical many times is a PE firm’s ability to bring conten-
tious stakeholders to a shared vision of the future.  The 
result is that private equity managers are experienced in 
the art of getting tough deals done.”).      
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ner.102  Generally, these auctions are “sealed-bid” auc-
tions, meaning that the bidders do not know the terms of 
the other bidders’ bids and the final bids remain final.103  
However, some auctions are “dripping wax” auctions in 
which the purportedly final bids are not actually final.104  
In such an auction, the “seller goes back to the few high-
est bidders, with the high bid used as leverage over the 
others in an attempt to force a raise. If successful, the 
new prices can be used against the former high bidder.”105      
  As Wasserstein has noted the success of an auction 
depends in large part on how the auction is run with an 
emphasis on the selective release of information during 
the auction process.106  Although the information provided 
to bidders in the offering memorandum and through due 
diligence “is extensive, it is not complete.”107  Thus, bid-
ders will likely have asymmetric information largely 
based on how the bidders interpret the information pro-
vided to them in the due diligence period as well as based 
on the pre-existing information already in their posses-
sion.  
                                                   
102  See In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 72  (listing such elements 
as reasons to deny Upper Deck continued friendly negoti-
ations); see also WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 747 
(“[O]ne bidder may offer a high price, an unfavorable con-
tract, and no concrete details regarding financing.  Anoth-
er bidder might be willing to pay less, but offer a ‘clean’ 
contract and quick closure.”).      
103  WASSERSTEIN, supra note 56, at 747.     
104  Id. 
105  Id.   
106  See id. at 748 (“If the process is managed correctly, 
bidders will be pulled along by the desire for more data.”). 
107  Hansen, supra note 20, at 32.  As Professor Hansen 
states, “Throughout the auction process, potential buyers 
may ask for information that the selling company will 
view as too confidential to reveal.”  Id. 
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    Although some scholars view public auctions as the 
best way to maximize stockholder value, there are cer-
tainly situations in which a public auction is not desira-
ble.  One such situation is when a board views an auction 
as placing the company at a competitive disadvantage.108  
For example, if a company conducts a public auction, the 
company risks losing employees, customers, and suppli-
ers.109  In addition, the company also runs the risk of be-
ing viewed by the market for corporate control as “dam-
aged goods” if the auction is unsuccessful.110  Thus, in the 
event of a failed auction, it may take some time for a com-
                                                   
108  The Delaware Court of Chancery also recognizes the 
potential risks involved with a public auction.  See In re 
Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 
2010) (implying leaked auctions may upset target’s em-
ployee base); In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holders Litig., 852 
A.2d 9, 21 (Del. Ch. 2004) (recognizing benefits to single 
bidder approaches).        
109  See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d at 597 
(recognizing possible employee strife resulting from 
leaked auction); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C.A. 
Nos. 9536, 9561, 1991 WL 165304, at * 668-69 (Del. Ch. 
July 31, 1991) (stating board resisted auction or market 
canvass fearing adverse affect on target’s “relationships 
with its employees, customers and suppliers”); Steven M. 
Davidoff, What the Sound and Fury Over Best Buy May 
Signify, N.Y. TIMES DEALB%K (Aug. 23, 2012 12:42 p.m.),  
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/what-the-sound-
and-fury-over-best-buy-may-signify/ (“Typically, targets 
are quite skittish about publicly talking about negotia-
tions. The reason is that this type of back and forth is un-
settling for the company’s employees and operations.”). 
110  Auctions in the M&A Process, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE 
(Nov. 2007); available at 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%
26A_Process.pdf. 
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pany to successfully sell itself.111  Furthermore, although 
potential bidders are required to execute confidentiality 
agreements before being provided with a confidential of-
fering memorandum or commencing due diligence, com-
panies also risk proprietary or sensitive information being 
disseminated to the public generally, and, in particular, to 
competitors.112  In some cases, the target may have al-
ready been approached by a potential purchaser whose 
bid may be lost if the target board were to choose to en-
gage in a full-blown auction.113  Another common situa-
tion when targets choose to forgo a public auction is when 
there are a limited number of viable potential buyers.  
This is typically a result of the target’s business type or 
on the financial situation.114  For example, a multi-billion 
                                                   
111  See Thomas W. Van Dyke, Chapter 6:  Embarking on 
the Sale Process, excerpted from A Practical Guide for the 
Business Lawyer, 2005, at 804 (detailing disadvantages of 
auctions, including length of time to sell company after 
failed auction).    
112  See also Topps, 926 A.2d at 62 (noting target’s “legiti-
mate proprietary concerns” about sharing information 
with competitor).   
113  See, e.g., id. at 70 (stating buyer’s bid contingent on 
target not conducting public auction); (same); See In re 
Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d at 604 (stating tar-
get weighed risk of losing potential buyer if target con-
ducted public auction); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 
926 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing risk of losing 
initial bidder if target engaged in public auction or risk 
initial bidder would pay less if response to auction was 
“underwhelming”).    
114 See Boone & Mulherin, supra note 42, 32-34 (“[T]he 
costs of operating auctions often imply that limiting the 
sales process can induce more aggressive bidding by those 
allowed to participate in the process. . . . The argument 
for a managed sales process may well be even stronger in 
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dollar corporation may have a limited number of suitors 
due to the corporation’s size or the industry in which it 
operates.115  Hence a selling corporation may choose in-
stead to engage in an informal auction process or to nego-
tiate exclusively with one bidder.     
 
2. The Pre-Signing Market Canvass and the 
Negotiated Acquisition 
 
  Another alternative available to target companies is 
the pre-signing market canvass, or the informal auction.  
This is really a variation on the full-blown auction pro-
                                                                                                                  
corporate M&A, particularly in cases involving one or a 
few large corporate bidders with significant expected syn-
ergies with the seller.”); Auctions in the M&A Process, 
FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2007); available at 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%
26A_Process.pdf. (“Generally, auctions drive value up if 
the buyer mix is robust . . .  A targeted approach may be 
warranted when there is obvious and limited universe of 
buyers…Whether or not an auction will be favoured over 
private negotiation will always depend on whether the 
seller is price-driven or motivated by other factors. Some-
times it’s clear who is going to pay the most for an asset 
so there is no real need to run an auction.”) 
115  In their research, Boone and Mulherin point to the 
$23 billion Wrigley deal in 2008, pursued through one-on-
one negotiations with Mars, and the 2008 Embarq deal 
with CenturyTel for $5 billion, resulting from a field of 
five potential buyers in the telecom industry, as examples 
of why large companies are more likely to sell themselves 
in one-on-one negotiations rather than auctions. See 
Boone & Mulherin, supra note 42, at 32-34. See also 
Boone & Mulherin, How Are Firms Sold?, supra note 56, 
at 871 (2007) (finding that “the choice of an auction or a 
negotiation in a particular takeover is related to charac-
teristics such as target size and industry”). 
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cess.  In this type of sale process, the target, or its finan-
cial advisor, contacts a number of potential bidders to 
gauge their interest in the target.116  The bidding process 
(if one does exist) is in “a less structured setting than that 
of a formal auction.”117 
  The pre-signing market canvass may help targets 
avoid the previously discussed costs involved in a “busted” 
auction as well as the costs involved in running a full auc-
tion.  Moreover, a pre-signing market canvass may take 
place after a previously not-for-sale target company has 
been approached by a bidder or in situations, as discussed 
in the next section, where the target has negotiated ini-
tially with only one bidder.  In any event, the interested 
potential bidders will be required to execute a confidenti-
ality agreement, typically containing a standstill, before 
gaining access to the target’s private information.    
 Another form of sale process is the negotiated acquisi-
tion or sequential procedure.  In this type of sale process, 
the target negotiates exclusively with one potential buy-
er.118  Like in the other sale processes, the potential buyer 
will be required to execute a confidentiality agreement, 
generally containing a standstill, prior to receiving the 
target’s confidential information.  If the initial potential 
buyer is willing to pay a high enough price, then the deal 
will sign without the target contacting other potential 
buyers.119  In some scenarios, a potential buyer may con-
dition its bid on the target not contacting any other poten-
tial buyers or otherwise performing a market canvass pre-
signing.     
 
                                                   
116  Boone & Mulherin, How Are Firms Sold?, supra note 
56, at 851.  
117  Id.  
118  Povel & Singh, supra note 9, at 1400.  
119  Id.  
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3. Relevant Merger Agreement Deal Terms and 
Post-Signing Sales Activities 
 
  Regardless of the sales method initially chosen howev-
er, because of a board’s fiduciary duty to consider higher 
bids, an auction-like setting will likely result from the 
sales process, implicating auction theory considera-
tions.120  No matter if the target performs an auction or 
negotiates with only one bidder, the resulting definitive 
merger agreement will be publicly announced within a 
day or two of execution.121  The merger agreement will 
likely contain a no shop provision paired with a fiduciary 
out.  The no shop provision prevents the target company 
from soliciting offers between signing and closing.122  But, 
the fiduciary out allows a target company’s board of direc-
tors to negotiate with a third party who makes an unsolic-
ited offer if the third party’s offer is a superior one or if it 
is reasonably likely to become a “Superior Offer,” as that 
term is defined in the merger agreement.123  In addition, 
the fiduciary out allows the target company to terminate 
the existing agreement in favor a third party offer if the 
board determines it would be a violation of its fiduciary 
duties not to do so.124  A typical prerequisite to the target 
providing information to, and negotiating with, the over-
bidder is that the over-bidder must execute a confidential-
ity agreement with terms that are no less restrictive than 
                                                   
120 Denton, supra note 20, at 1533. 
121  Audra Boone & L. Harold Mulherin, Do Termination 
Provisions Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?, 20 
REV. FIN. STUD. 461, 475 (2007). 
122  Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits 
on Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 72-73 
(2010). 
123  Id. at 73. 
124  Id. 
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the initial acquirer’s confidentiality agreement.125  Thus, 
because the initial acquirer’s confidentiality agreement 
generally contained a standstill, the over-bidder’s confi-
                                                   
125 See Denton, supra note 20, at 1539-40 (noting that go-
shops typically require “any third-party bidder to sign an 
‘Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement’ with the seller in 
order to have access to any material nonpublic infor-
mation” in analyzing a typical go-shop provision, which 
defined “Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement” as “(i) 
any confidentiality agreement between the Company and 
any such Person existing as of the date of this Agreement 
and (ii) any confidentiality agreement entered into after 
the date of this Agreement that contains provisions that 
are no less favorable in the aggregate to the Company 
than those contained in the Confidentiality Agreement”); 
Robert Little, Travis Souza & Rachel Harrison, No-Shops 
& Fiduciary Outs: A Survey of 2012 Public Merger 
Agreements, DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.dallasbar.org/content/mergers-and-
acquisitions-section (finding, based on data from 53 public 
company merger agreements in 2012 with transaction 
values over $1 billion, that in most merger agreements an 
acceptable confidentiality agreement with an alternative 
bidder is one that is “no less favorable” or “not less re-
strictive”). See also Status Conference and Motion to Ex-
pedite at 89, In re Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. S’holder 
Litig., C.A. Nos. 6574-CS & 6776-CS  (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 
2011) (discussing a provision in a merger agreement re-
quiring third party bidders to sign a confidentiality 
agreement with a standstill no less favorable than the one 
between the parties to the merger, and noting that it is an 
“accepted norm of deal negotiation where a merger party 
insists that later arriving bidders who are going to have a 
chance play by certain rules that are as stringent as the 
rules that apply to them”). 
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dentiality agreement will likely contain a standstill.126  As 
will be detailed in Part V., the possibility exists a target 
board could use the standstill as a means of favoring the 
initial acquirer over the over-bidder.          
 Recently, parties have also begun to use go-shop provi-
sions in some transactions.127  Unlike a no shop provision, 
go-shop provisions allow a target company to actively so-
licit third party offers post-signing for a limited period of 
time.128  Like the no shop, a typical go shop requires bid-
ders to execute a confidentiality agreement with no less 
restrictive terms than the initial acquirer’s confidentiality 
agreement meaning the bidder will be subject to a stand-
still.129   
III. CURRENT USE OF STANDSTILLS IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 
 Although standstills are ubiquitous in today’s public 
company M&A deals, to date the Delaware courts have 
not extensively addressed the use of standstills.  In fact, 
most of Delaware’s guidance on the use of standstills in 
M&A transactions comes to us through dicta.  This sec-
tion summarizes those recent cases in which the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery has commented on standstills.  In 
addition, this section also includes a description of two 
non-litigated transactions in which standstills played a 
significant role in the sales process. 
 
                                                   
126 David Marcus, Confis, standstills and courts (Sept. 30, 
2011), available at 
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/041657/commentary
/confis,-standstills-and-courts.php  
127  Sautter, Go-Shops, supra note 83, at 554-55 (discuss-
ing use of go-shops).   
128  Id. at 557. 
129  See, e.g., In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 66 (recognizing bid-
der required to execute confidentiality agreement contain-
ing standstill during go-shop period).   
2013]  AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS 37 
 
 
  
A.  Topps & the Impact of Standstills on the Sales Pro-
cess 
 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s 2007 decision in In re 
Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation provides some helpful 
insight on the role and impact of standstills in a sale of 
corporate control.130  That case involved a leveraged 
buyout of Topps Co.131  The deal between the Michael 
Eisner-led buyout group and Topps ensured the retention 
of the majority of the company’s key employees and senior 
management, including the CEO and Chairman’s son-in-
law who served as the company’s President and Chief 
Operating Officer.132 
Although a pre-signing auction or market canvass was 
unacceptable under Eisner’s proposal, Eisner agreed to a 
go-shop provision.133  Thus, the merger agreement “gave 
Topps the chance to shop the bid for 40 days after signing, 
and the right to accept a ‘Superior Proposal’ after that, 
subject only to Eisner’s receipt of a termination fee and 
his match right.”134 The termination fee amounted to 3.0% 
of the transaction value during the go-shop period and 
4.6% of the transaction value following the go-shop 
period.135 
 At the outset of the go-shop period, Topps’s financial 
advisor “contacted 107 potential strategic and financial 
bidders, [of which] five expressed interest in Topps and 
began a due diligence review.”136  The only serious bidder 
who emerged during the go-shop period was Upper Deck, 
                                                   
130  926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
131  In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 60-61.  
132  Id. at 60, 61, 73-74.  
133  Id. at 61, 70. 
134 Id. at 61.  
135  Id. at 66.  
136  Id.  
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a competitor of Topps.137  Upper Deck’s bid, which was 
submitted two days before the expiration of the go-shop 
period, was for $10.75 cash per share, $1 more per share 
than the Eisner proposal.138   
The Topps board met after the go-shop period expired 
to determine whether Upper Deck was an “Excluded 
Party” under the terms of the Topps-Eisner merger 
agreement, which would have allowed Upper Deck and 
Topps to continue talks past the expiration of the go-shop 
period.139 The Topps board decided Upper Deck was not 
an “Excluded Party” raising concerns regarding Upper 
Deck’s ability to finance the deal as well as antitrust 
issues including the possibility antitrust authorities may 
delay or prevent the transaction and Upper Deck’s failure 
to sufficiently assume the antitrust risk.140  Upper Deck 
then made an unsolicited proposal and offered to divest 
key licenses if required to do so by antitrust regulators.141  
The Topps board again determined the unsolicited 
proposal was not a superior proposal raising similar 
concerns.142 In addition and perhaps more importantly for 
purposes of this Article, the Topps board rejected Upper 
Deck’s request to be released from the standstill 
agreement.143  The standstill prevented Upper Deck from 
making public any information about its discussions with 
Topps and also prevented Upper Deck from launching a 
tender offer for Topps shares without the Topps board’s 
permission.144 
 A group of Topps stockholders and Upper Deck moved 
for a preliminary injunction maintaining that by refusing 
                                                   
137  Id.  
138  Id.  
139  Id. at 72. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 90. 
142  Id. at 72-73.  
143  Id. at 62.  
144  Id.  
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to release Upper Deck from the standstill “Topps [was] 
denying its stockholders the chance to decide for them-
selves whether to forsake the lower-priced Eisner Merger 
in favor of the chance to accept a tender offer from Upper 
Deck at a higher price.”145  Then Vice Chancellor Strine 
began his analysis of the case by acknowledging the “le-
gitimate purposes” standstills can serve including “estab-
lish[ing] rules of the game that promote an orderly auc-
tion” and providing a target with “leverage to extract con-
cessions from the parties who seek to make a bid.”146  At 
the same time, Strine acknowledged a board could use 
standstills for illegitimate purposes like “favor[ing] one 
bidder over another, not for reasons consistent with 
stockholder interest, but because managers prefer one 
bidder for their own motives.”147  Strine further recog-
nized the Topps board’s reservation of the ability to waive 
the standstill if the board’s fiduciary duties required it to 
do so “was an important thing to do, given there was no 
shopping process before signing with Eisner.”148  At the 
same time, the board had an obligation to use its contrac-
tual powers for appropriate purposes.149   
 By refusing to release Upper Deck from the standstill, 
the Topps board was preventing its stockholders from ac-
cepting a potentially higher offer and was preventing its 
stockholders from receiving information regarding the 
transaction.150  Moreover, the refusal to release Upper 
Deck from the standstill prevented Upper Deck from at-
taining antitrust clearance.151  As a result, Strine found 
Upper Deck “has shown a reasonable probability of suc-
                                                   
145  Id. at 63.  
146  Id. at 91.  
147  Id.  
148  Id.  
149  Id.  
150  Id.  
151  Id.  
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cess on its claim that the Topps board is misusing the 
Standstill” and that Topps board’s asking its stockholders 
to cash out and then foreclosing its stockholders from re-
ceiving Upper Deck’s offer was “likely, after trial, to be 
found a breach of fiduciary duties.”152  Until quite recent-
ly, Strine’s decision in Topps was the leading case provid-
ing guidance on how dealmakers may use standstills dur-
ing a sale of corporate control.             
 
B.  Potential Enforceability of DADW Standstills After 
Topps 
 
 Five recent transactions from 2011 and 2012 provide 
helpful commentary on the potential enforceability of 
DADW standstills.  The first two cases, In re Celera Cor-
poration Shareholder Litigation and In re RehabCare 
Group, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, arose in the context 
of the Delaware Chancery Court’s approval of settle-
ments.153  Thus, those cases simply provide dicta regard-
ing the enforceability of DADW standstills.  However, two 
significant rulings were issued in the final months of 2012 
that considered DADW standstills in depth. In the third 
case, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litiga-
tion, Vice Chancellor Laster invalidated a confidentiality 
agreement because it contained a DADW standstill.154 In 
the fourth case, In re Ancestry.com Inc. Shareholder Liti-
gation, Chancellor Strine found that the target board had 
breached the duty of care because of the way it employed 
a DADW standstill, not simply because the board did 
                                                   
152  Id.  
153 In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., Civ. Action No. 6304-
VCP (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012); In re Rehabcare Group, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 
2011). 
154 Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling, In 
re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-
VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012). 
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so.155  The Court of Chancery did not have an opportunity 
to weigh in on the fifth, Apollo’s and KSL Capital Part-
ners Management III, LLC’s fight for Great Wolf Resorts.  
But, that deal provides an excellent example of the poten-
tially erosive effects on shareholder value maximization 
that some standstills may have during the pre-closing pe-
riod.    
 
1.  RehabCare and the Questioned Viability of 
DADW Standstills Following Topps 
 
 In late 2007 through early 2008, RehabCare Group, 
Inc. (“Rehabcare”) and Kindred held preliminary discus-
sions regarding Kindred’s possible acquisition of 
RehabCare.156  At that time, “Kindred submitted a pre-
liminary indication of interest to acquire RehabCare at a 
price of $25.00 per share, with half payable in cash and 
the other half in Kindred common stock.”157  But the dis-
cussions ended after the parties were unable to reach an 
appropriate valuation for RehabCare.158  By the summer 
of 2010, however, RehabCare’s situation changed, as its 
stock price “dropped significantly.”159  The RehabCare 
board met in August to review  strategic alternatives, in-
cluding “potential acquisition targets . . . and potential 
financial and strategic partners.”160  The board deter-
mined the only viable strategic acquirer for RehabCare 
                                                   
155 The Court’s Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction, In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., 
C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) 
156 RehabCare Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8K) 
(May 12, 2011).   
157  Id.  
158  Id.  
159  Id.  
160  Id.  
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was Kindred.161  In making that decision, the board con-
sidered “four other logical potential strategic acquirers of 
RehabCare and the various reasons that each such party 
would not be a likely acquirer.162  These reasons included, 
among others, public statements, prior business contacts, 
leverage constraints, recent significant acquisitions, and 
various regulatory and legal matters with respect to such 
third parties.”163  However, the board was unsure about 
Kindred’s willingness to proceed with a transaction based 
on the previous failed discussions between the two par-
ties.164  The board directed its financial advisor to contact 
certain financial buyers to assess their interest in a po-
tential transaction.165  The board also decided not to con-
tact strategic bidders based on the board’s analysis of 
those potential bidders’ willingness to engage in an acqui-
sition with RehabCare as well as the board’s concern at 
sharing confidential information with competitors.166 
 Starting on October 1, 2010, CGMI contacted nine fi-
nancial buyers, including parties referred to as Party A 
and Party B in the SEC disclosures.167  The financial buy-
ers “were selected based on their experience in the 
healthcare industry and their ability to finance a transac-
tion of this size.”168  Of the nine, eight executed confiden-
tiality and standstill agreements preventing those parties 
from making unsolicited offers for RehabCare.169  At the 
end of October, Kindred expressed an interest in engaging 
in a transaction but it did not formally submit a bid, Par-
ty A submitted a preliminary offer in a price range of 
                                                   
161  Id.  
162  Id.  
163  Id. 
164  Id.  
165  Id.  
166  Id.  
167  Id.  
168  Id.  
169  Id.  
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$25.00 to $27.00 per share and, on November 1, 2010, 
Party B submitted a preliminary offer at a price of $27.00 
to $30.00 per share.170  The other financial buyers did not 
submit offers and withdrew from the sales process.171  The 
next day, the RehabCare board met and determined to not 
pursue discussions with either Party A or Party B, whose 
offers were insufficient.172  On November 4, 2010, Kin-
dred’s CEO called RehabCare’s CEO and expressed an in-
terest in an all cash acquisition of RehabCare at a price 
range between $32 and $34 per share.173  A couple of 
weeks later, Kindred and RehabCare entered into a confi-
dentiality agreement, including reciprocal standstill pro-
visions.174  Discussions and due diligence continued 
through December.175  On December 28, 2010, Kindred 
submitted a written offer of $32.00 per share, payable 
$27.00 in cash and $5.00 in Kindred common stock.176  
RehabCare’s board met and determined it would not ac-
cept Kindred’s offer, viewing it as inadequate.177  
     About a week later, Kindred increased its offer price to 
$35.00 per share.178  Under the revised offer, $26.00 was 
payable in cash and $9.00 was payable in Kindred com-
mon stock.179  The parties executed a merger agreement 
on February 7, 2011.180  Following the merger announce-
ment, a number of RehabCare stockholders brought class 
action suits against the RehabCare directors and Kin-
                                                   
170  Id.  
171  Id.  
172  Id.  
173  Id.  
174  Id. 
175  Id.  
176  Id.  
177  Id.  
178  Id.  
179  Id.  
180  Id.  
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dred.181  Those suits were consolidated and, on May 12, 
2011, the parties reached a memorandum of understand-
ing regarding a settlement.182   
 Under the settlement, the RehabCare and Kindred 
completely eliminated matching rights from the agree-
ment, reduced their termination fee by 50 percent, and 
issued supplemental disclosures.183  More importantly for 
purposes of this Article, they waived existing standstill 
provisions” and “sent letters to a number of financial 
sponsors waiving [the] provisions.”184  The only issue be-
fore the court was the legal fees for the plaintiff’s coun-
sel.185  With respect to the DADW standstills, Vice Chan-
cellor Laster commented as follows: 
 
I do think it is weird that people persist in 
the "agree not to ask" in the standstill.  
When is that ever going to hold up if it's ac-
tually litigated, particularly after Topps? It's 
just one of those things that optically looks 
bad when you're reviewing the deal facts. It 
doesn't give you any ultimate benefit because 
you know that the person can get a Topps 
ruling making you let them ask, minimum, 
or can ask in a back channel way. Why 
would you hurt yourself in terms of the op-
tics by asking for that? One of those strange 
things in life.186 
 
Hence, at least in Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion, even 
in the context of a more thorough sales process compared 
                                                   
181  Id.  
182  Id.  
183  Id. 
184  In re Rehabcare Group, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 
6197-VCL, at 4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011). 
185  Id. 
186  Id. at 46.  
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to the sales process conducted in Topps, DADW stand-
stills may not be upheld during the pre-closing period.   
 
2. Celera and the Pre-Closing Period “Informa-
tional Vacuum”  
 
 Several months after Vice Chancellor Laster’s state-
ment in RehabCare, Vice Chancellor Donald F. Parsons, 
Jr. addressed a similar DADW standstill also in the con-
text of a class action settlement, in In re Celera Corp. 
Shareholder Litigation.  The roots of that case began in 
November 2009 when the board of directors of Celera 
Corporation, a healthcare company with three primary 
business units, started to consider potential strategic 
transactions for the company.187  In early February, the 
Celera board instructed its financial advisor, Credit 
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, and Celera senior manage-
ment to engage in discussions with potential buyers re-
garding a sale of the whole company, its individual assets, 
or business units.188  Credit Suisse and Celera’s CEO 
“contacted nine potential bidders, five of which performed 
at least some measure of due diligence on the Company by 
April 2010:  (1) Illumina, Inc.; (2) Inverness Medical Inno-
vations, Inc.; (3) Laboratory Corporation of America Hold-
ings; (4) Qiagen, N.V.; and (5) Quest.189  Each of the five 
companies who performed due diligence executed a confi-
dentiality agreement containing a standstill preventing 
them from “making offers for Celera shares without an 
express invitation from the Board.”190  The confidentiality 
agreements also included “a broadly worded provision 
                                                   
187  In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., Civ. Action No. 
6304-VCP, 3, 5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012).  
188  Id. at 5-6. 
189  Id. at 6.  
190  Id.  
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preventing the signing parties from asking the Board to 
waive this restriction (the ‘[DADW] Standstills’).”191   
 In mid-April, Quest made a nonbinding preliminary of-
fer to acquire the company as a whole for $10 cash per 
share.192  Quest’s offer was conditioned on the execution of 
several employment agreements with Celera’s “key per-
sonnel” including the CEO.193  In addition to the Quest 
offer, other parties made “lesser offers” and “one indica-
tion of interest from ‘Bidder C’” to acquire the company’s 
products division.194  Following negotiations with Celera’s 
special committee, which was formed to oversee the sales 
process, on June 25 Quest increased its offer by 25 cents 
to $10.25 per share.195  The special committee determined 
$10.25 was acceptable and authorized the CEO to negoti-
ate her employment agreement with Quest.196  However, 
after meeting with the CEO, Quest “withdrew from the 
merger citing the potential effects” of a negative study on 
one of Celera’s drugs, KIF6, that Quest learned of during 
negotiations with the CEO as well as “‘concerns regarding 
retention of the Company’s management following the 
consummation of the proposed transaction.’”197  Through-
out the remaining six months of 2010, Celera continued to 
pursue strategic transactions but “no serious suitors 
emerged.”198  During those six months, “Celera’s business 
was deteriorating, due in part to the publication of the 
negative KIF6 study in October.”199   
                                                   
191  Id.  
192  Id. at 7.  
193  Id.   
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196  Id.   
197  Id. at 7-8.  
198  Id.  
199  Id.  
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 On January 27, 2011, Quest submitted an offer of $7.75 
per share to acquire Celera.200  A few days later, Celera 
rejected an offer from Bidder C to acquire the company’s 
products division, instead choosing to focus on the Quest 
offer.201  Negotiations proceeded with Quest and eventual-
ly, in mid-February, Quest and Celera entered into a 
merger agreement.202  Under the agreement, Quest would 
commence a twenty-day tender offer for Celera common 
stock at $8 per share.203  The agreement contained a no 
shop provision requiring Celera “to end any existing dis-
cussions, and not to solicit competing offers from, poten-
tial bidders other than Quest.”204  The agreement also 
contained a termination fee amounting to 3.5% of the 
transaction value, “but arguably as much as 10% of Cel-
era’s enterprise value.”205   
 Following the merger announcement, a Celera share-
holder brought suit alleging that the Celera board had 
breached its fiduciary duties by executing an agreement 
with Quest.206  Celera and Quest negotiated a settlement 
with the lead plaintiff pursuant to which the termination 
fee would be reduced from $23.45 million to $15.6 million 
and the no shop provision would be amended so that bid-
ders subject to the DADW provision of the standstill 
would be invited to submit bids.207   
 Vice Chancellor Donald F. Parsons, Jr. issued an opin-
ion upholding the settlement agreement.208  In the deci-
sion, Parsons stated he was not proclaiming DADW 
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standstills unenforceable.209   Moreover, Parsons recog-
nized DADW standstills are prevalent in today’s M&A 
world and stated that any opinion declaring such provi-
sions unenforceable could only be made on an “appropri-
ately developed record.”210  At the same time, Parsons 
stated the “[p]laintiffs have at least a colorable argument 
that these constraints collectively operate to ensure an 
informational vacuum.”211  Once the board is in an “in-
formational vacuum,” it would not have any information 
pursuant to which it could evaluate whether continuing to 
comply with the merger agreement terms would violate 
the board’s fiduciary duties.212 Thus, he explained, 
“[c]ontracting into such a state could constitute a breach 
of fiduciary duty.”213  Following Vice Chancellor Parsons’ 
thought process it is difficult to imagine a DADW stand-
still that would not have the effect of placing the board in 
a change of control transaction in the same “informational 
vacuum.”  
 
3. Genomics and the Invalidity of DADW Stand-
stills Preventing Even Private Indications of 
Interest     
 
 A little over a year after considering the Rehabcare 
deal and opining on DADW standstills, Vice Chancellor 
Laster was given a better opportunity when the issue was 
placed squarely before him. On November 27, 2012, Vice 
Chancellor Laster issued a bench ruling in which he en-
joined the enforcement of a DADW standstill—without 
any suggestion that the sales process was inadequate or 
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that a party restrained by the standstill desired to make a 
bid.214  
 The DADW standstill at issue was entered into by 
Complete Genomics and a third party during a sales pro-
cess that began in May 2012.215 During the process, forty-
two parties were contacted and nine parties expressed in-
terest and signed confidentiality agreements.216 After re-
ceiving six proposals, the Complete Genomics board nar-
rowed the field to two parties.217 One of those parties, 
Party H, withdrew after the board declined its request for 
exclusivity.218 The board continued to negotiate with the 
remaining bidder, BGI, and was able to reach a deal in 
September.219 Party H later reentered the picture, unin-
hibited by any standstill provision, and submitted another 
bid on November 5.220 However, the Complete Genomics 
board concluded that the bid, which only represented a 
5% premium and carried greater antitrust concerns, did 
not constitute a superior proposal.221 The injunction is-
sued by Vice Chancellor Laster pertained to the DADW 
standstill entered into by Party J, who had only partici-
pated briefly in the sales process.222 Party J’s first expres-
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sion of interest came only a few weeks prior to July 31, 
the date which final proposals were due from Party H and 
BGI.223 Although late to join, Party J was held to the 
same deadline.224 However, on August 2 Party J indicated 
that it was not interested in pursuing a transaction, and 
had no further communications with the Complete Ge-
nomics board prior to the issuance of the preliminary in-
junction.225 Party J neither sought the injunction nor was 
involved in the litigation.226 
 In the ruling, Vice Chancellor Laster started by analo-
gizing bidder-specific no-talk clauses, which were invali-
dated in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals 
Co.,227 to DADW standstills reasoning that both can simi-
larly disable a board from making a reasonably informed 
decision.228 While not ruling that DADW standstills were 
invalid per se, the fact that Complete Genomics had rec-
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ommended the BGI transaction was influential in the de-
cision.229 Laster reasoned that the Complete Genomics 
board precluded the possibility of providing a current and 
candid recommendation through the DADW standstill 
agreement because it prevented the flow of information 
from Party J.230 He found the agreement essentially em-
bodied one to breach the duty of care to be informed of all 
material information necessary to make a reasonably in-
formed recommendation.231 Quoting section 193 of the Re-
statement of Contracts, Vice Chancellor Laster found a 
reasonable probability that the DADW standstill provi-
sion “represents a promise by a fiduciary to violate its fi-
duciary duty, or represents a promise that tends to induce 
such a violation.”232  
 Turning to the requirement of irreparable harm, he 
found that the situation could not be remedied even in ab-
sence of a bid from Party J, who would be required to 
“cavalierly breach its own promise” to present such a 
harm. 233 Harking back to bidder-specific no-talk clauses, 
the harm existed because incoming information from bid-
ders would be prevented under any circumstance, regard-
less of whether Party J breached the standstill.234 Thus, 
his concern focused on the harm caused by the board’s act 
of pre-emptively preventing communication altogether, 
not the harm that could result from another party being 
unable to bid.235 Vice Chancellor Laster supported his 
reasoning by adding that a topping bid, presumably from 
Party H, was present but also went on to say that the rea-
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soning would apply in absence of a topping bid.236 Reflect-
ing these concerns, the scope of the preliminary injunction 
only sought to ensure that the channels of communication 
were not closed: the order invalidated the provision of the 
standstill to the extent that it prevented Party J from 
making private requests for permission to submit bids 
and had no effect on such public communications.237 
 
4. Ancestry.com and Legitimate Use of DADW 
Standstills for Value Maximizing Purposes 
 
 Less than three weeks after Vice Chancellor Laster 
ruled on DADW standstills in Complete Genomics, Chan-
cellor Strine weighed in, although expressing a very dif-
ferent view on the issue. In Ancestry.com, Chancellor 
Strine was critical of the manner in which the board used 
the DADW standstill, but otherwise sanctioned their gen-
eral use as an auction tool for value-maximization pur-
poses.238 
 The Ancestry.com sales process began in January 2012 
when Party A, a private equity firm, contacted a repre-
sentative of Spectrum Equity Investors to learn more 
about the company.239 Spectrum, also a private equity 
firm, had made a minority investment in Ancestry.com in 
2003, later partnered with management to purchase a 
majority interest, and helped to take the company public 
in 2009.240 As of October 25, 2012, Spectrum owned a 
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30.7% stake in Ancestry.com.241 In February of 2012, the 
Ancestry.com board was informed of the potential interest 
expressed by Party A and decided to explore engaging a 
financial advisor.242 On March 16, the board authorized 
discussions with Party A, subject to entry into a confiden-
tiality agreement, which was executed by Party A later 
that day.243 After meeting with Party A, a representative 
of Party A indicated an interest in exploring a transaction 
for a price between $30 and $32 a share.244 The board de-
termined to perform a market check to evaluate the indi-
cation of interest from Party A.245 
  On April 22, a representative of private equity firm 
Permira Funds contacted Ancestry.com management to 
discuss a potential transaction.246 On May 15, the board 
formally approved Qatalyst as its financial advisor and 
authorized Qatalyst to begin conducting outreach to po-
tential bidders.247 From May 15 to May 24, Qatalyst con-
tacted four potential strategic bidders and eight private 
equity firms including Party A and Permira.248 On May 
17, Permira executed a confidentiality agreement.249 On 
May 21, Party C, also a private equity firm, executed a 
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confidentiality agreement.250 Party B and Party D, poten-
tial strategic acquirers, both declined to participate in the 
sales process.251 On May 30 and 31, four additional pri-
vate equity firms, Parties E, F, G, and H executed confi-
dentiality agreements.252 On June 6, Bloomberg News re-
ported that Ancestry.com had retained Qatalyst as a fi-
nancial advisor.253 On June 14, Party J, a private equity 
firm, executed a confidentiality agreement.254 Two poten-
tial strategic acquirers executed confidentiality agree-
ments: Party I on June 4 and Party L on July 11, but nei-
ther ever submitted a proposal.255  
 On June 18, Party A reaffirmed its purchase price 
range $31 to $34 per share.256 During the week of June 20 
certain parties, all private equity firms, submitted prelim-
inary proposals pursuant to a June 9 process letter.257 
Purchase prices ranged from $31-$38.258 After the Ances-
try.com board met to discuss proposals, Qatalyst notified 
the lowest bidders Party A, Party F, and Party H that 
they would not be invited to continue in the process.259 
Party G dropped out of the sales process on July 9.260 
 Party K, a private equity firm that first expressed in-
terest on June 13, indicated a price range of $33 to $35 on 
June 25, and executed a confidentiality agreement on 
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June 28.261 After a July 9 meeting, the board determined 
to invite Party C, Party J, and Permira to submit final 
bids.262 However, on August 2 Party J ceased due dili-
gence efforts, after substantially lowering its valuation 
range.263 On July 24, an article was published in the New 
York Times reporting that Ancestry.com was possibly go-
ing private.264 On August 6, Party C also lowered its val-
uation based on its due diligence, indicating a $31 price as 
the sole equity sponsor and $32 with a substantial equity 
partner.265 On August 7, Permira followed suit, lowering 
its price to $33 per share, contingent on an additional eq-
uity partner.266 
  The Ancestry.com board had several meetings over the 
next few weeks to discuss alternatives, including re-
engaging Party A, who remained interested in pursuing a 
transaction, either as the sole purchaser or through a 
partnership with Permira.267 Believing that a collabora-
tion between Party A and Permira would lower Party A’s 
standalone bid, the board authorized Permira and Party 
C to begin discussions.268 However, the joint proposal 
from Permira and Party C was returned at a price of $30 
per share.269 Party A later indicated that based on further 
due diligence, it would only be able to offer $28 per 
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share.270 On September 10, Reuters published a story on 
the sales process.271  
 Over the next few weeks, the board told Party C that 
an offer at $30 would not be acceptable and focused on as-
sisting Permira with additional financing strategies.272 
On October 2, Bloomberg news published an additional 
report on the sales process.273 The report discussed the 
difficulties seen in reaching a price, noting that private 
equity firms on both sides of the deal created tension and 
that Spectrum likely needed to sell to satisfy investment 
exit requirements typically imposed on private equity 
firms.274 On October 3, Permira submitted a proposal for 
$31 per share.275 After further negotiations, Permira 
raised its bid to $32, stating that it would not go any 
higher.276 After making additional modifications, the 
merger agreement was executed on October 21.277 
 Litigation was filed challenging the propriety of the 
DADW standstills used in the process that were not pre-
viously mentioned in the SEC filings.278 Ancestry.com re-
acted on December 11 and sent letters waiving the DADW 
provisions to allow parties to request standstill waivers.279 
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On December 17, Chancellor Strine issued his ruling.280 
Strine was careful to take a fact based approach and not 
make a per se ruling, noting the limited precedential val-
ue of bench rulings generally before discussing Complete 
Genomics and Celera.281 Strine contemplated that DADW 
standstills could be used consistently with a board’s fidu-
ciary duties, but only when used for a particular value-
maximizing purpose.282 More specifically, he stated that 
the “purpose has to be to allow the seller as a well-
motivated seller to use it as a gavel, to impress upon the 
people that it has brought into the process the fact that 
the process is meaningful; that if you're creating an auc-
tion, there is really an end to the auction for those who 
participate.”283 
 Strine went on to find that, had the board not waived 
the DADW provisions, it would not have been using the 
DADW standstill for a specific value-maximizing purpose 
because it was not used in the manner he set forth.284 In 
fact, the Ancestry.com board and CEO were not even 
aware of the clause or its potency and it was not clear 
whether Qatalyst was informed either.285 In light of the 
waiver, Strine’s order merely required disclosure of the 
circumstances surrounding the use and waiver of the 
DADW provision.286 
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5.  The Potentially Erosive Effects of Standstills 
on Value Maximization During the Pre-
Closing Period 
 
 In addition to the potential informational vacuum and 
communication issues caused by standstills pre-closing, if 
used improperly, standstills may have other potentially 
erosive effects on value maximization.  For example, as 
Chancellor Strine recognized in Topps, target boards can 
use standstills to favor a “winning” bidder over others.287  
In addition, “winning” bidders will generally advocate for 
strict standstills as a form of deal protection device that 
can preclude “losing” bidders from any participation after 
signing.288  Both of these scenarios became a reality in the 
2012 sale of Great Wolf Resorts. 
 The sale of Great Wolf began in January 2011 when 
various private equity groups and potential strategic buy-
ers approached Great Wolf representatives expressing in-
terest in a potential transaction.289  Between January  
and June, the company entered into five confidentiality 
agreements with strategic and financial parties, including 
Apollo.290  At a June 22 meeting, the Great Wolf board be-
gan a more formal strategic review process and instructed 
its legal advisor “to review the five confidentiality agree-
ments previously entered into with potential bidders and 
to negotiate amendments to such agreements as appro-
priate given the Company’s defensive profile.”291  Follow-
ing the meeting, Great Wolf revised several confidentiali-
                                                   
287 In re Topps, 926 A.2d at 91. 
288  Id. 
289  Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation, Recommenda-
tion Statements (Form SC 14D9) (Mar. 13, 2012). 
290  Id. 
291  Id. 
2013]  AUCTION THEORY & STANDSTILLS 59 
 
 
  
ty agreements  to include standstill provisions “for the 
protection of Great Wolf.”292   
 On July 27, Great Wolf’s Strategic Review Committee 
authorized Deutsche Bank to begin a formal process, and  
approximately 38 potential bidders, including strategic 
and financial parties, were contacted.293  Deutsche Bank 
distributed confidentiality agreements to approximately 
33 parties interested in a strategic transaction.294  Be-
tween July 27 and December 23, Great Wolf entered into 
confidentiality agreements with 11 additional parties, in-
cluding parties referred to in SEC filings as Party N and 
Party J, and continued to amend previously executed con-
fidentiality agreements to include more restrictive stand-
still covenants.295  Of particular note is that the Apollo-
Great Wolf standstill remained far less restrictive than 
any agreement entered into by Great Wolf.296  
 As the sales process progressed, the field was narrowed 
to Party N, Party J, and Apollo.297 After evaluating pro-
posals, Great Wolf agreed to an exclusivity agreement 
with Apollo Management (the “Exclusivity Agreement”) 
on December 21 based largely on financing considerations 
and the fact that Apollo had conducted greater due dili-
gence.298  Yet, much additional negotiation was needed, 
and several successive extensions of exclusivity occurred 
before Great Wolf accepted an offer from Apollo priced at 
$5 per share.299  On March 12, 2012, the transaction, 
structured as a tender offer, was approved and executed 
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by Apollo and Great Wolf.300  The next day and also the 
very same day the transaction was publicly announced, 
Apollo commenced the tender offer, which was only 
scheduled to be open for 21 business days.301 
 The definitive agreement provided a strong deal protec-
tion scheme for Apollo.302  The definitive agreement con-
tained a no-shop provision and provided Great Wolf would 
not “terminate, waive, amend, modify or fail to enforce 
any existing standstill or confidentiality obligations owed 
by any Person to the Company or any of its Subsidiaries,” 
subject to limited exceptions.303  Under the no-shop, Great 
Wolf was only permitted to entertain unsolicited bona fide 
written takeover proposals.304  Great Wolf also agreed to 
“immediately cease and cause to be terminated any dis-
cussions or negotiations with any parties that may be on-
going with respect to any Takeover Proposal as of the date 
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of the Merger Agreement.”305  In combination, the deal 
protections and reinforced standstill—created through an 
agreement made to the exclusion of the other parties—
ensured that losing bidders would not even think about a 
bid.  
 After the merger announcement, Great Wolf’s shares 
began to trade well above the $5 offer price from Apollo, 
shareholders began to publicly criticize the deal, and sev-
eral lawsuits were filed.306  Thereafter on April 4, despite 
Apollo’s iron-clad deal protection scheme, Great Wolf con-
firmed by press release the receipt of an unsolicited bid 
from KSL Capital Partners at a price of $6.25 per 
share.307 On April 5, in accordance with the definitive 
agreement, KSL and Great Wolf entered into a confiden-
tiality agreement.308  However, that agreement waived 
the standstill provisions with respect to the April 4 KSL 
Proposal and any future favorable proposals from KSL.309  
A bidding war ensued between Apollo and KSL until 
Apollo delivered the last blow with a $7.85 offer, and an 
increase in termination fees to $10.467 million, to which 
Apollo and Great Wolf agreed on April 20.310 
 The $7.85 offer price represented a premium of 171% to 
the six-month average of Great Wolf’s share price prior to 
the announcement of Apollo’s original offer on March 12, 
2012, a premium of 136% over the ninety-day average of 
Great Wolf’s share price prior to the announcement of the 
original offer, and a premium of 87% over Great Wolf’s 
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closing stock price on the day prior to the announcement 
of the original offer.311 
 On April 25, an agreement in principle was reached in 
the litigation.312  In connection with the settlement, Great 
Wolf agreed to make certain disclosures in its SEC filings 
and waive the standstill provisions with certain parties, 
including Party N, solely for the purpose of allowing those 
parties to deliver a confidential unsolicited bona fide writ-
ten takeover proposal.313 In addition to exposing the de-
tails of the standstill agreements and the poison pill men-
tioned earlier, the disclosures required by the settlement 
revealed that during the process Deutsche Bank may 
have had a material conflict of interest and Great Wolf 
may have been aware.314 Luckily for the Great Wolf 
shareholders, the favorable treatment of Apollo, that 
granted excessive deal protections facilitated by the use of 
a standstill, did not ultimately prevent the highest offer 
from being made. 
 
C. Hollywood Video & the Potential Detrimental Im-
pact of Standstills During Pre-Closing Market 
Checks  
 
  In the context of a post-signing market check, the po-
tential detrimental impact of requiring over-bidders to 
execute the same constrictive standstill to which the ini-
tial acquirer is subject may be best illustrated by events 
surrounding the sale of Hollywood Video.  On December 
10, 2003, the Hollywood board met to discuss strategic op-
tions after Mark Wattles, the founder, chairman, CEO, 
and second largest shareholder of Hollywood Entertain-
ment, had been informed of various private equity firms 
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that could potentially acquire Hollywood, including Leon-
ard Green & Partners (LGP ). 315Wattles met with LGP, 
negotiations continued over the following weeks, and LGP 
signed a non-disclosure agreement containing a three-
year standstill provision.316  On February 19, 2004, LGP 
submitted a formal proposal to acquire 100% of Holly-
wood’s stock for $13 per share in cash.317   
 The following day, the Special Committee rejected the 
$13 price as inadequate and decided not to solicit addi-
tional bidders, fearing the risks of material non-public in-
formation leaks or a failed transaction.318  LGP then 
raised its offer to $13.50 per share and proposed several 
ancillary agreements with Wattles.319  After negotiations 
over the ancillary agreements, LGP raised its offer to $14 
per share  and the merger agreement was executed on 
March 28.320 
 The merger agreement contained a no-shop provision 
with a fiduciary out.321  Litigation ensued, resulting in a 
settlement requiring additional disclosures in the proxy 
statements, a reduction of the termination fee from $26.5 
million to $21.2 million, and that Wattles’ shares would 
not be counted in voting on the merger.322  After  LGP ex-
pressed doubt about whether the  financing condition of 
the merger agreement could be satisfied,  the merger 
agreement was amended on October 13 to reduce the 
                                                   
315  Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Preliminary Proxy 
Statement (Form PREM14A) (Apr. 23, 2004). 
316  Id. 
317  Id.  
318  Id.  
319  Id. 
320  Id. 
321  Id. 
322  Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (Jul. 8, 2004). 
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price from $14 to $10.25, and eliminate the termination 
fee and no shop provision.323   
Beginning the week of October 25, UBS contacted 25 
potential financial buyers and 12 potential strategic buy-
ers, including Movie Gallery and Blockbuster.324  On Oc-
tober 28, Movie Gallery requested confidential infor-
mation.325 To access confidential information, the amend-
ed merger agreement  required bidders to enter into a 
confidentiality agreement no less favorable to Hollywood 
than the one entered into by LGP, which contained a 
three-year standstill.326  Movie Gallery initially objected 
to the standstill provision.327  On October 29, Blockbuster 
also requested confidential information..328 
 On November 2, Blockbuster delivered an all-cash pro-
posal at$11.50 per share. but also indicated that it was 
unwilling to enter into a standstill with a three-year 
term.329  Movie Gallery first unsuccessfully sought to re-
vise the standstill term from three years to one year,  but 
on November 19, inexplicably entered into a confidentiali-
ty agreement identical to the agreement between Holly-
wood and LGP with a three-year standstill.330  On De-
cember 1, Movie Gallery increased its offer to $13.25 
cash.331 Blockbuster later issued a press release confirm-
ing it was interested and able to raise its offer, subject to 
elimination of the standstill.332  
                                                   
323  Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Preliminary Revised 
Proxy Statement (Form PRER14A) (Oct. 27, 2004). 
324  Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Preliminary Proxy 
Statement (Form PREM14A) (Jan. 26, 2005). 
325  Id. 
326  Id. 
327  Id. 
328  Id. 
329  Id. 
330  Id. 
331  Id.  
332  Id. 
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 A Special Committee meeting was held a few days later 
to consider LGP’s indication that it would waive the obli-
gation under the merger agreement to include a standstill 
provision.333  The Special Committee concluded that in-
cluding a standstill for all bidders would yield the highest 
possible price by encouraging bidders to submit their best 
offers during the market check process, knowing that they 
would be precluded from making a later bid.334 It further,  
concluded that the standstill assured bidders that the 
process would be fair to all involved and refused to elimi-
nate the standstill provision.335 
 Blockbuster again issued a press release reiterating its 
unwillingness to enter into a three-year standstill and on 
December 28, Blockbuster announced it would commence 
a tender offer for Hollywood at $11.50 cash per share.336 
On January 10, 2005, Hollywood announced it had termi-
nated the LGP agreement and entered into an agreement 
with Movie Gallery.337  On February 2, Blockbuster raised 
its tender offer to a price of $14.50 per share, comprised of 
$11.50 cash and $3 stock.338 However,  However, on 
March 25 Blockbuster announced it would no longer pur-
sue the tender offer..339 
 Had Blockbuster been brought into the market check 
process, its presence might have pressured a bidding war 
between strategic rivals..  After the Blockbuster bid re-
ceived backing from Carl Icahn, Wattles stated, “A strate-
gic buyer can afford to pay more for this company than a 
                                                   
333  Id. 
334  Id. 
335  Id. 
336  Id. 
337  Id.  
338 Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Solicitation, Recom-
mendation Statements (Form SC 14D9) (Feb. 17, 2005). 
339 Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (Apr. 1, 2005). 
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financial buyer and I am a financial buyer.”340A three 
year standstill, as Scott Keller, president of 
Dealanalytics.com stated, is “highly unusual,” and “[o]ne 
year is the norm.”341 
 The imposition of onerous standstills like the one in 
Hollywood Video is not unique in the M&A world.  Alt-
hough they are common, as the next section details, the 
imposition of such standstills is potentially detrimental to 
shareholders in a sale of corporate control and is contrary 
to auction theory principles.   
IV. BALANCING FRIENDS AND FOES IN A SALE OF CORPORATE 
CONTROL 
 In most corporate transactions, the parties on both 
sides of the negotiating table use contracts to manage and 
balance risks.  In the context of M&A transactions, stand-
stills are one of the main contractual tools used to balance 
risks inherent in the sale process.  Namely, target boards 
                                                   
340 Jonathan Berr, Blockbuster Says Hollywood Offer Fac-
es ‘Difficulty’, Bloomberg (Dec. 22, 2004, 16:46), available 
at Blockbuster Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 
99.1) (Dec. 23, 2004). 
341 Jonathan Berr, Blockbuster Says Hollywood Offer Fac-
es ‘Difficulty’, Bloomberg (Dec. 22, 2004, 16:46), available 
at Blockbuster Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K, Exhibit 
99.1) (Dec. 23, 2004). The three-year standstill require-
ment imposed on subsequent bidders stemmed from the 
original agreement with LGP, when LGP and Wattles 
were going to buy Hollywood together. Hollywood Enter-
tainment Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form 
PREM14A) (Apr. 23, 2004).  Wattles was to continue serv-
ing as CEO and remain a substantial equity investor in 
the surviving company. Id. The contemplated employment 
agreement between Wattles and LGP was to terminate on 
the third anniversary of the merger. Hollywood Enter-
tainment Corp., Schedule 13E-3 (Form SC 13E3, Exhibit 
99.D4) (Apr. 23, 2004).  
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use standstills legitimately to control the sale process to 
ensure friendly bidders remain friendly and do not be-
comes foes that preempt the process.  However, in the 
context of a change of control transaction, standstills also 
potentially carry a risk they will inhibit and not enhance 
shareholder value.  This section uses auction theory prin-
ciples and examples of dealmakers’ real world uses of 
standstills to detail how standstills help to enhance the 
sales process.  But this does not mean that all standstills 
will universally aid the value maximization process in 
every deal.  When standstills contain certain provisions or 
are used in certain ways, standstills can inhibit value 
maximization. Specifically, standstills with unusually re-
strictive terms can contractually prevent fair and open 
competition and hurt the sales process.   Moreover, even 
though initially a standstill may seem relatively un-
restrictive, it can become overly restrictive when a defini-
tive merger agreement is signed. Contractual provisions 
in the agreement can enhance the restrictiveness of exist-
ing standstills, resulting in a combination that, not only 
affects the rights of parties not privy to the merger 
agreement, but becomes prohibitive to final value maxi-
mization. Standstills that are, or become, overly restric-
tive should not be used unless careful consideration is 
given and the particular circumstances of the deal war-
rant their application. While a board’s actions need not be 
perfect, courts should be particularly wary of standstills 
that do more to restrict the sales process than to promote 
the best deal. 
 
A. Standstills in General – Using Standstills to Make 
Friends, Prevent Foes, and Maximize Stockholder 
Value 
 
 With so many moving pieces in a real world M&A auc-
tion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to rely on one factor 
to extract higher bids during the pre-signing sales pro-
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cess.  At the same time, standstills play an important role 
in the negotiation and sale of public companies.  
Dealmakers certainly believe standstills enhance the bid-
ding process for public targets.  But the ultimate question 
is whether this is truly the case.   
 In the case of a pure auction, Professors Bulow and 
Klemperer argue that because participants are “relatively 
ill-informed” when entering an auction the auction is 
“more profitable” than other sale processes, namely a se-
quential process.342  Because bidders enter into most 
standstills as part of a confidentiality agreement and in 
consideration for the receipt of confidential information, 
many bidders would not have access to information if they 
were not willing to execute a standstill.343  
  Thus, by being willing to play by the “rules of the game,” 
a bidder is able to engage in due diligence and is on a 
more level playing field with respect to information 
asymmetries.  Therefore, a bidder is better able to make 
an informed decision regarding its valuation of the target.  
Auction theorists have found that by being provided with 
proprietary information a bidder is put at ease and is 
more likely to submit a higher bid.344  It follows that 
standstills likely enhance the pre-signing bidding process 
to the extent standstills are inextricably tied to the provi-
sion of information.  Moreover, standstills may provide 
bidders with an economic incentive to submit their high-
est bid because of the opportunity cost of losing the auc-
tion, perhaps to a competitor, by not submitting the best 
bid. 
                                                   
342  Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1546.   
343  Boone & Mulherin, supra note 42, at 34 (“In exchange 
for signing [standstill] agreements, prospective bidders 
are given access to non-public information about the seller 
. . . .”). 
344  Id. at 34 (“Revealing proprietary information can re-
duce uncertainty for some buyers, which increases the 
price they are willing to pay.”) 
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 Auction theorists have also found the implementation 
of rules and commitment to those rules play a significant 
role in whether a given sales process maximizes stock-
holder value.345  By implementing rules like standstills 
targets are able to control the sales process.  In turn, po-
tential bidders receive some assurance that another bid-
der engaged in the process will not preempt the sales pro-
cess by submitting a bid prematurely.346  Due to these as-
surances bidders may be more likely to submit a higher 
bid.  Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, most con-
fidentiality agreements and standstills prevent bidders 
from revealing that negotiations are taking place.  That 
combined with the fact that standstills prevent bids be-
fore the target is ready to receive them, allows the target 
to control the flow of information regarding valuation.  As 
previously discussed because most auctions are “sealed-
bid” auctions, the bidders are kept uninformed of each 
others’ bids so the target is able to ensure that a “high” 
bidder will not reduce its bid or refuse to raise its bid af-
ter learning that the next closest bid is somewhat low-
er.347     
Another significant factor in whether a bidder is will-
ing to submit a higher bid may turn on whether strategic 
or financial bidders are involved in the process.  As a re-
sult, this Article advocates that courts and dealmakers 
should consider standstills on a continuum from least re-
strictive to most restrictive.  A significant factor in how 
restrictive a standstill may be and still be deemed legiti-
mate would be the types of bidders involved in the sale 
process.      
 
1.   Strategic Bidders & the Private Value Sale 
Process 
                                                   
345 Povel & Singh, supra note 19, at 1425. 
346 See supra Part I.C. 
347  See text accompanying supra note 103.  
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 Generally, strategic bidders are interested in the actu-
al business of the target or the target’s distinct character-
istics that the strategic bidder may exploit for synergistic 
purposes.348  As Professors Gorbenko and Malenko point 
out, strategic bidders “are less tied to publicly observable 
characteristics” like financial statements or market indi-
cators so that the end result is that each strategic bidder’s 
valuation of the target is “unique.”349  Because strategic 
bidders tend to operate in related businesses, releasing 
confidential information to these bidders is more likely to 
result in a loss of competitive advantages for the target.350 
As such, targets have a keen interest in controlling the 
sale process and particularly the release of nonpublic in-
formation to strategic bidders.  Accordingly, stronger, 
more restrictive standstills may help to protect the target 
while at the same time encourage strategic bidders to 
submit higher bidders. 
 Because of the unique synergies at stake in any given 
transaction, a strategic bidder may be willing to pay more 
for a target, but at the same time, a strategic bidder also 
has more to lose.  If a strategic bidder does not “win” a 
particular auction, there may not be similar companies in 
existence that have the same characteristics as the target.  
Moreover, if multiple strategic bidders who are competi-
tors are involved in a particular auction process, the stra-
tegic bidder may be further motivated to submit a higher 
bid as the bidder’s loss will be its competitor’s gain.  So, 
losing the bidding war to a competitor could result in an 
even greater loss to the strategic bidder.  Therefore, if a 
strategic bidder is bound by a stronger standstill it has 
even greater reasons to put forth its best bid during the 
                                                   
348 See supra Part I.A. 
349  Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 2, manuscript at 4.   
350 Povel & Singh, supra note 19, at 1405 (noting that 
strategic buyers can be competitors, suppliers, or custom-
ers). 
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bidding process.  Hence, in a sales process where only 
strategic bidders are bidding more biased procedures such 
as more restrictive standstills may help to deal with in-
formation asymmetries and encourage bids.   
  
2. Financial Bidders & the Common Value Sale 
Process 
 
 Unlike strategic bidders, most financial bidders are 
not viewing targets with an eye toward synergistic re-
sults.351  Instead, these bidders tend to base their valua-
tions “on observable factors, captured by the information 
about the targets available from the market and financial 
statements.”352  As financial buyers differ from strategic 
buyers because they do not similarly operate in the same 
business as the target and tend to base their bids on pub-
lic information, the same concerns regarding confidential 
information releases are not present, and thus the need 
for a more protective standstill is also lessened. Although 
financial bidders may have some variation in their bid 
prices stemming from their own individual estimates or 
projections, it is more likely that a certain price or range 
of prices will likely serve as the price that gets the tar-
get.353  Unlike strategic bidders, most financial bidders 
will not have as much to lose in “losing” an auction be-
cause potential synergies are not at stake. Because tar-
gets do not provide a source of unique value to a financial 
bidder, they are more likely to view targets as inter-
changeable and not have an incentive to pursue any one 
target.  
 Financial bidders are also more likely to be able to 
force a deal because they are sophisticated in deal making 
and because they have leverage, like little to no anti-trust 
                                                   
351 See supra Part I.A. 
352  Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 5, manuscript at 4.  
353 See supra Part I.A. 
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uncertainty and substantial financing resources, with 
which to work.  It follows that a more restrictive standstill 
will likely do little to encourage higher bids.  In fact, the 
more restrictive standstill could serve the opposite pur-
pose and prevent financial bidders from making a bid.   
 Yet another factor to consider with financial bidders is 
their tendency not to overbid another financial bidder’s 
signed transaction.354  Chancellor Strine even acknowl-
edged these gentlemen’s agreements saying that it is “a 
reality that there is not a culture of rampant topping 
among the larger private equity players, who have rela-
tionships with each other that might inhibit such behav-
ior.”355  A recent lawsuit against eleven private equity 
firms suggest that these gentlemen’s agreements may 
have extended into pre-signing auctions and that private 
equity firms colluded during the 2003-2007 merger wave 
to drive down the price of target companies.356 More spe-
cifically, the lawsuit alleges there was a “secret pact” 
among the firms in which there was a “‘you don’t bid on 
my deal, I won’t bid on yours’ understanding.”357 Against 
this backdrop, it is hard to imagine how a more restrictive 
standstill would work to extract more value. Indeed, if the 
                                                   
354  Sautter, supra note 83, at 560. After private equity 
giant, Blackstone, outbid Kolhberg Kravis Roberts 
(K.K.R.) for Freescale Semiconductor, Hamilton Jones, 
Blackstone’s President, wrote to his colleagues, “‘Henry 
Kravis [co-founder of K.K.R.] just called to say congratu-
lations and that they were standing down because he had 
told me before they would not jump a signed deal of ours . 
. . .’”  Peter Lattman & Eric Lichtblau, E-Mails Cited to 
Back Lawsuit’s Claims That Equity Firms Colluded On 
Big Deals, N.Y. TIMES DEALB%K (Oct. 10, 2012 7:42 p.m.). 
355  In re Lear, 926 A.2d at 121.  
356  Peter Lattman & Eric Lichtblau, E-Mails Cited to 
Back Lawsuit’s Claims That Equity Firms Colluded On 
Big Deals, N.Y. TIMES DEALB%K (Oct. 10, 2012 7:42 p.m.). 
357  Id.  
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allegations of collusion are correct, standstills would like-
ly be rendered valueless.    
 
B. Using Restrictive Standstills to Extract More Value 
and Make “Friends” 
 
 Although standstills generally aid in value maximiza-
tion, overly restrictive standstills may cause adverse ef-
fects to a sales process involving corporate control.  
Standstills are overly restrictive when the provisions of 
the agreement are far too strict or onerous than necessary 
to accomplish the intended functions required of stand-
stills in the sales process.  In particular, this section fo-
cuses on potentially restrictive standstills such DADW 
standstills and longer-term standstills.  In a previous ar-
ticle, Promises Made to be Broken? Standstill Agreements 
in Change of Control Transactions, I argued the Delaware 
courts are likely to resolve issues relating to the reasona-
bleness of standstill restrictions and the grant of a waiver 
(or the promise not to waive a standstill) based on the 
reasonableness of the target board’s sale process.358  More 
specifically, the courts are likely to examine the pre-
signing sales process in resolving these issues.359  But 
that article did not address the more fundamental issue of 
whether the use of such restrictive standstills results in 
shareholder value maximization. I argue that this ques-
tion should be answered by recognizing the need to main-
tain the standstill’s teeth but not sharpen them when 
other deal protection mechanisms alleviate the workload 
borne by standstills post-signing.  Moreover, consistent 
with the auction theory principles set forth previously, the 
restrictiveness and use of standstills should be evaluated 
based on the types of bidders involved in the sale process.  
                                                   
358  Sautter, supra note 6, at manuscript at 60 n.433. 
359  Id. 
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1. DADW Standstills 
 
 In Celera, Vice Chancellor Parsons warned that 
DADW standstills may have the effect of placing the tar-
get board in an informational vacuum and that once the 
board is in such a vacuum it would not be able to obtain 
information pursuant to which it could evaluate whether 
continuing to comply with the merger agreement terms 
would violate the board’s fiduciary duties.360  As a result, 
Parsons suggested that the board of directors would be 
breaching its fiduciary duties.361  Laster then commented 
in RehabCare that DADW standstills “optically look bad” 
and that they are likely inconsistent with Strine’s ruling 
in Topps.362  Laster also seemed to suggest that even in 
the context of a fully shopped deal, a DADW standstill 
may not be valid.363  Chancellor Strine, also the author of 
the Topps opinion, issued the most recent commentary 
and ruling on DADW standstills in Ancestry.com.  In that 
case, Strine focused on whether the standstill was being 
used as a “gavel” with a specific a value maximizing pur-
pose and whether the bidders were made aware there 
may not be any more bites at the apple.364  Although 
seemingly irreconcilable at first glance, these opinions can 
be combined with auction theory principles and folded in-
to a workable system in which targets can utilize these 
                                                   
360  In re Celera, C.A. No. 6304-VCP, at 53-54.  
361  Id. at 54. 
362  In re Rehabcare, C.A. No. 6197-VCL, at 46.  
363 See Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court’s Ruling, 
In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 
7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012) and Telephonic Oral 
Argument and the Court’s Ruling, In re Complete Ge-
nomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 27, 2012). 
364 Id. at 23. 
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more restrictive standstills to enhance value maximiza-
tion.  
 This system begins by dividing the sales processes into 
those with mainly strategic bidders and those with mainly 
financial bidders.  As previously described, because stra-
tegic bidders tend to private values for a target stemming 
from the valuation strategic bidders give the particular 
synergies which may be realized if the bidder were to ac-
quire the target, more restrictive standstills, like DADW 
standstills, may help a target extract greater value from 
strategic bidders.  However, some limitations must be 
placed on the use of the standstills to obtain the most val-
ue enhancing incentives.  First, consistent with Strine’s 
indication in Topps and my argument in Promises Made 
to be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control 
Transactions, the target board must engage in significant 
pre-signing shopping of the target.  Such a pre-signing 
shopping may help the board to eliminate the potential 
for placing itself in the informational vacuum of which 
Vice Chancellor Parsons warns.  Second, consistent with 
Chancellor Strine’s comments in Ancestry.com, all bidders 
entering into the bidding process and entering into stand-
still agreements with the target must be fully informed of 
the rules in advance, including the fact that the stand-
stills will not be waived once the sales process has come to 
an end.  Third, to maintain the integrity of the sales pro-
cess, the target must continue to abide by the rules it sets 
forth and not make concessions to one bidder over another 
or otherwise favor one bidder.   
 Fourth, unlike the DADW standstills we have seen to 
date, I contend the standstill should be paired with a min-
imal fiduciary out.  That is, a bidder bound by such a 
standstill should be able to privately request a waiver if it 
can set forth compelling and clearly delineated reasons 
that it would like to make or increase its bid.  These rea-
sons should be based on external and intervening factors 
such as the release of new information, which would cause 
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the bidder to increase its valuation of the target.  This 
minimal fiduciary out is analogous to the merger recom-
mendation fiduciary out for intervening events that have 
become popular in recent years.365     
 In my previous article, Promises Made to be Broken? 
Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, 
I made clear that although the Delaware courts may like-
ly take a different path based on their dicta to date, I was 
of the opinion that boards of directors should not be able 
to completely limit their ability to review superior offers 
in the context of sale of corporate control.366  Allowing 
“losing” bidders to request a waiver and make an overbid 
pursuant to a minimal fiduciary out strikes a balance be-
tween the concern that boards should not foreclose them-
selves from considering higher bids and the legitimate 
goal as supported by auction theory principles of using 
standstills to extract more value pre-signing.      
 If such a fiduciary out were to be implemented, it 
should be paired with a slightly higher termination fee 
applicable in these limited circumstances to these bidders. 
For example, if the merger agreement contains a 3% ter-
mination, a 4 or 4.5% termination fee may be appropriate.  
The goal behind the minimal fiduciary out is to limit or 
eliminate the informational vacuum these standstills po-
tentially cause.  By pairing the minimal fiduciary out 
with a slightly increased termination fee, the goal is 
maintain the “teeth” of the standstill.  
 Moreover, a similar staggered termination fee has been 
used in some recent deals in the context of a change of 
merger recommendation based on an intervening event 
rather than a superior proposal.367  In those deals, if the 
                                                   
365  For a description of these merger recommendation fi-
duciary outs for intervening events, see Sautter, supra 
note 122. 
366 Sautter, supra note 6, at manuscript at 60 n.433. 
367  David Fox & Daniel E. Wolf, Something Old, Some-
thing New . . . A Quick Survey of Recent Developments in 
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board were terminate the agreement for an intervening 
event, a higher termination fee becomes payable.368  Thus, 
dealmakers have experience in negotiating and interpret-
ing these intervening events as well as the staggered ter-
mination fees that may be applicable.   
 As previously established, unlike with strategic bid-
ders, more restrictive standstill provisions may not lead to 
the same value maximizing results with financial bidders.  
The same “system” may be implemented in sale processes 
involving mainly financial bidders but because financial 
bidders tend to have a common value for a target, the 
DADW standstill is not likely to extract much additional 
value.  With financial bidders, the already in place gen-
tlemen’s agreements and possible collusion appear to ren-
der such restrictive standstill provisions useless. 
 The foregoing framework rests on the assumption that 
the sales process used is that of a classic auction as de-
scribed in Part II.B.1.  The likelihood of a classic auction 
being used as the chosen sales process is significant as 
Professors Boone and Mulherin’s study of 400 corporate 
takeovers found that half resulted from an auction pro-
cess.369  The framework would also work in the context of 
an extensive market canvass as described in Part II.B.2.  
Although dealmakers should opt for less restrictive stand-
still terms in such situations as there is a greater risk 
that they have not shopped the market and that the value 
                                                                                                                  
Public M&A Deal Terms, Kirkland M&A Update, 1 (May 
2, 2011), available at 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpdat
e_050211.pdf (mentioning deals with a higher termination 
fee payable for a change of recommendation for an inter-
vening event); see also Sautter, supra note 122, at 103-04 
(suggesting a higher termination fee be applicable to in-
tervening event change of recommendations).   
368  Fox & Wolf, supra note 367.  
369  See Part II.B.I.  
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being received is not as high as that which could be re-
ceived pursuant to an auction.     
 
2. Longer-Term Standstills 
 
 Standstills with unusually long durations, like that in 
the Hollywood Entertainment deal, can be overly restric-
tive.  Hollywood Entertainment’s three-year term stand-
still lasted for a period three times as long as that of an 
average standstill.  Because of this burdensome provision, 
at least one major player, Blockbuster, was not even will-
ing to enter into the standstill agreement and participate 
in a friendly process.  Considering that the brick and mor-
tar movie rental industry market—which as we now know 
and leaders of all companies involved in the process 
feared—was rapidly declining, a three-year standstill 
would have imposed severe limitations on Blockbuster’s 
ability to pursue a strategic transaction with Hollywood 
Entertainment.370  The same would hold true for many 
businesses in today’s rapidly changing global market-
place, when over a period of three years entire industries 
and business can rise or fall.  Implementing such a long 
standstill could actually have the reverse effect of value 
maximization.  Using a standstill with such a long dura-
tion can deter viable and wealthy bidders from participat-
ing in a friendly process which could result in a higher bid 
after confirmatory due diligence.  Moreover, such a long-
term standstill could cause hostile action, further risking 
to disrupt a certain, but less favorable, deal already in 
place.  
 Further, the Hollywood deal shows the potential harm 
to future bidders who are not part of the original sales 
process or even privy to a standstill, but enter the picture 
after a definitive agreement is announced. A typical pro-
vision in a merger agreement requires that for any new 
bidder to gain access to confidential information, it must 
                                                   
370 See source cited supra note 342. 
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enter into a confidentiality agreement no less favorable to 
the bidder than the one entered into between the parties 
to the merger agreement. Thus, the winning bidder will 
be able to use this provision as leverage or to impose an 
abnormally long standstill on future offers to inhibit their 
ability to make higher proposals and protect the deal at 
the expense of shareholders. 
 While every sales process is different and often the tar-
get may need substantial protections, in most instances 
the decision to use an abnormally long standstill will not 
be value additive to the sales process.  These standstills 
are not responsive to changing market conditions or new 
circumstances that arise over a relatively lengthy sales 
process. Instead the term of the standstill should bear a 
direct relationship to the industry in which the target op-
erates taking into consideration possible market changes 
as well as the type of sales process being used.  For exam-
ple, dealmakers should consider the time needed to con-
duct the sales process whether it is an auction, market 
canvass, or a limited negotiation and the time it will take 
to get to closing.  To be reasonable, standstills should be 
tailored to take into account these factors and should not 
far exceed the estimated time to closing.     
 Opting for a timeframe beyond that estimate makes it 
appear that the board is using the standstill for potential-
ly nefarious means.  While standstills should be strong 
enough to discourage bids outside of the sales process, 
they should not be used to completely prevent a bidder 
from making any offer at any time.  If greater protections 
or incentives are needed, a myriad of other readily availa-
ble deal protection devices can be used to encourage bid-
ders to put their best bids on the table.  
 
3. An Alternative to Highly Restrictive Stand-
still Terms 
 
 In lieu of using restrictive standstills, including the 
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revised DADW “system” described previously, the target 
and the “winning” bidder have other alternatives in the 
form of deal protection devices.  A definitive acquisition 
agreement for a publicly traded target generally contains 
a number of deal protection devices aimed at preventing 
third party overbids during the pre-closing period.  In ne-
gotiating these deal protection devices, the target and ini-
tial acquirer can tailor their deal protection devices so 
that they specifically hinder bids being submitted by bid-
ders who have previously executed a standstill.  More 
specifically, the parties could adopt a staggered termina-
tion fee such that if the target were to enter into a trans-
action with an over-bidder who had previously executed a 
standstill, that transaction would result in a higher ter-
mination fee than would typically be paid under the 
agreement.   
The possibility of a higher termination fee may incen-
tivize bidders to submit their best offers during the pre-
signing sales process. For example, the typical termina-
tion fee in a M&A transaction is 3-4% of the deal value.371  
The merger agreement between a target and a winning 
bidder could contain a 3% termination fee applicable to 
most termination events, including the target’s termina-
tion of the agreement to enter into an agreement with a 
third party over-bidder who was not bound by a standstill.  
If, however, the third party over-bidder is a party bound 
by a standstill, a higher termination fee, like 5%, could be 
applicable.   
 Dealmakers could also increase the termination fee 
based on how well shopped the company was pre-signing.  
                                                   
371 David Fox & Daniel E. Wolf, Something Old, Some-
thing New . . . A Quick Survey of Recent Developments in 
Public M&A Deal Terms, Kirkland M&A Update, 2 (May 
2, 2011), available at 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/MAUpdat
e_050211.pdf (noting most merger agreements provide for 
a break-up fee between 2% and 4% of deal value). 
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For example, if the target held a full public auction pre-
signing, the termination fee applicable to third party over-
bidders bound by a standstill could be higher.  This may 
further incentivize bidders to submit their highest bids 
pre-signing as a higher termination fee would be applica-
ble to them post-signing. Moreover, the “winning” bidder 
would be further assured that its deal would be protected 
by virtue of the termination fee. 
 
C. Standstills that Become Unusually Restrictive 
When Combined with Other Contractual Rights:  A 
Backdoor Method of Limiting Stockholder Value 
  
 In addition to standstills that may be considered overly 
restrictive such as DADW standstills and longer term 
standstills, a seemingly less restrictive standstill could be 
combined with other contractual rights to result in a 
scheme detrimental to value maximization.  When stand-
stills continue to impose obligations on all parties after 
one party enters into a definitive merger agreement, the 
world of contractual rights among bidders and the target 
substantially change, but the standstill usually does not.  
This is a foreseeable event and perhaps one of the main 
reasons that standstills contribute to value maximization. 
Because the standstill will continue to operate to restrict 
the manner in which a losing bidder may make an offer, if 
an offer is allowed at all, bidders are incentivized to make 
their best offers during the period when offers are freely 
invited. Further, bidders know that, even if a standstill 
can somehow be overcome, there is a cost to jumping a 
winning deal, so most would rather be the first to sign.  
However foreseeable a change in position regarding the 
standstill is though, bidders will not know the extent of 
this change in rights until the merger agreement is an-
nounced. 
 From signing onward to closing, the same level of inef-
ficiency that Professors Bulow and Klemperer argue 
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makes the auction more profitable does not necessarily 
exist. 372  Of course, new bidders who have previously not 
engaged in due diligence and been privy to the target’s 
confidential information will still be “relatively ill-
informed.”  But, at the same time, a potential over-bidder 
benefits from knowing the price being paid by the winning 
bidder, from seeing the deal embodied in the merger 
agreement, and from having access to any other publicly 
available information regarding the pre-existing deal.  In 
other words, a potential over-bidder can free-ride to a cer-
tain extent on the existing deal to make an acquisition 
proposal.  Those bidders who were part of the pre-signing 
sales process and gained access to the target’s publicly 
available information, are obviously at a greater ad-
vantage in this respect.   
 Of course, if all the bidders knew that the standstill 
would disappear after the signing of an agreement then 
all bidders would not necessarily be incentivized to sub-
mit their highest bid before signing, at least by virtue of 
the standstill.  There are advantages to being the first to 
sign however, such as deal protection devices that would 
discourage bidders from submitting uncompetitive bids. 
But, for standstills to be effective pre-signing, they must 
continue after a deal is signed, or else they may be ig-
nored.  Granted that a standstill needs to continue after a 
deal is signed to have any integrity, it should not become 
even more restrictive and made part of an impenetrable 
deal protection scheme. 
 An excellent example of this potentially impenetrable 
deal protection scheme is the Great Wolf deal.373  In that 
deal, the standstills executed by the potential bidders 
seemed to become DADW standstills but only after the 
definitive acquisition agreement was executed.  The bid-
ders in that transaction entered the process and executed 
standstills on the belief they were on a level playing field.  
                                                   
372  Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 59, at 1546.   
373 See supra Part III.B.5. 
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However, without asking for final bids from the bidders, 
Great Wolf granted Apollo exclusivity, which ultimately 
led to an executed agreement between the two parties.  
After the execution of the Great Wolf-Apollo agreement, 
the previously executed standstills prevented the bidders 
from making an offer for Great Wolf.374  Not only did the 
standstills continue to restrict bidders interested in Great 
Wolf, in combination with the other deal protections em-
bodied in the Great Wolf-Apollo agreement, a standstill 
waiver could not be affected.375  Thus, the standstill be-
came, what I would dub, a Reverse DADW standstill.  
Luckily for the Great Wolf shareholders however, KSL 
who was uninhibited by a standstill, created the oppor-
tunity for a more fair and open sales process and thereby 
increased shareholder wealth by 157%.376  
  But, the other bidders were unable to participate when 
KSL entered the picture because of the transformation of 
the standstill into a Reverse DADW standstill.   
 A Delaware court is not likely to find such a Reverse 
DADW Standstill to be valid using either Vice Chancellor 
Laster’s or Chancellor Strine’s reasoning.  Applying 
Chancellor Strine’s reasoning from Ancestry.com, the pro-
vision was not used as a “gavel” with the goal of value 
maximization.377  
  Based on the facts as extracted from SEC filings, Great 
Wolf does not appear to have run an auction during which 
bidders were asked to make final bids and were told in 
advance of the auction ending.378  Because of this, the 
bidders may have been operating under the assumption 
they could request a waiver if need be.  Instead of using 
the standstill as a means of extracting greater value by 
                                                   
374 See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
375 See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text. 
376 See supra notes 308-12 and accompanying text. 
377 In re Ancestry.com, C.A. No. 7988-CS, at 23. 
378 See supra notes 292-99 and accompanying text. 
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instructing bidders to submit their best and final offers 
for possible deal protection in the resulting agreement, 
Great Wolf appears to have used the standstills as a form 
of deal protection device which favored Apollo.  Under An-
cestry.com, this is potentially even more problematic than 
using a DADW standstill whereby bidders would be made 
aware of the consequences. 
 Not only would these Reverse DADW standstills not 
carry weight under Strine’s reasoning but also a court ap-
plying Vice Chancellor Laster’s reasoning would likely 
find that a target’s use of such a combination would result 
in an informational vacuum.379  The bidders previously 
bound by the standstills would not be able to make a bid 
and the target board, like the Great Wolf board, would not 
be able to waive the standstill provision to consider poten-
tially higher bids.  The end result then places the board in 
an informational vacuum when making its recommenda-
tion regarding the contemplated transaction.  Thus, the 
Reverse DADW standstill combination like the DADW 
standstill would likely be invalid in Laster’s view.   
 In cases like Great Wolf, what starts out as a necessary 
prelude for the protection of the target and the facilitation 
of an exchange of confidential information can turn into a 
value-maximization deterrent for the target, and a power-
ful deal protection device for the first party that obtains a 
signed agreement.  Standstills customarily are used to de-
ter hostile bids or control the auction process and prevent 
a bidder from buying the target at a bargain price.  When 
standstills are combined with other contractual provisions 
to preempt the auction process and prevent interested 
buyers from any further participation in the sales process, 
standstills can become an impediment to value maximiza-
tion.  Reminiscent of the methods used by the mafia to 
“eliminate the competition,” basic supply and demand dic-
tates that the result will allow a bidder to buy the target 
at a bargain price.   
                                                   
379 See In re Complete Genomics, C.A. No. 7888-VCL. 
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CONCLUSION 
  Standstills, the M&A equivalents of a “school-yard 
time-out,” have become standard features of the public 
company sales process.  Despite the prevalence of stand-
stills, the courts and academics alike, have not fully ad-
dressed the role of standstills in the sales process or 
whether they aid in maximizing stockholder value.  Auc-
tion theorists agree that a significant factor in any M&A 
sale process is the presence of asymmetric information.  
In most auctions, standstills allow the target to control 
the process by keeping bidders uninformed of each other’s 
bids and ensuring that no bidder with preempt the pro-
cess while giving  bidders access to its proprietary infor-
mation, assuring bidders of their valuation.  Thus, stand-
stills help to enhance the sales process by selectively con-
trolling information releases to encourage higher bids.  As 
such, standstills at least aid in providing a floor for the 
valuation of the target.  In doing so, standstills help to 
keep bidders friendly.     
 At the same, however, when standstills are enhanced 
to provide greater restrictions on the sales process or per-
form functions after the execution of a definitive agree-
ment with a “winning” bidder, there is a risk these re-
strictions could have detrimental effects on value maximi-
zation.  This Article uses auction theory to provide a 
framework pursuant to which more restrictive standstill 
provisions, like DADW standstills, may be used legiti-
mately under certain circumstances to extract value from 
bidders.  This framework takes into account several fac-
tors including that such restrictive standstills only be 
used pursuant to a thorough shopping process in which all 
bidders are informed that they may never have another 
bite at the apple.  Moreover, this frameworks provides 
that such standstills be paired with a minimal fiduciary 
out based on intervening events that carried a slightly in-
creased termination fee.  Other forms of restrictive stand-
stills, such as standstills with long durations or reverse 
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DADW standstills, should be declared invalid.  As an al-
ternative to restrictive standstills, this Article also sug-
gests using a staggered termination fee that can better 
achieve value maximization with less risk. In adopting 
the framework set forth in this Article, dealmakers would 
strike a balance between keeping bidders from becoming 
foes to the “winning” bidder while at the same time en-
couraging the maximization of stockholder value.  
 
  
